One hallmark of U.S. President Joe Biden’s young presidency is his tough-on-China stance. Biden’s approach to China so far has been less erratic and boisterous than former President Donald Trump’s, but he’s taken pains to ensure it’s just as resolute.
As Biden continues to craft a strategy for standing up to China, he’s reaching for a tool that was underused in the Trump administration: the so-called Quad, an informal security forum among Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.
“We view the Quad as having essential momentum and important potential, so we’ll build on it by deepening cooperation on areas of traditional focus,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price told reporters during a briefing on Monday.
Foreign ministers representing the Quad, known formally as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, met virtually on Feb. 18 and pledged to strengthen cooperation and oppose “unilateral and forceful attempts” from China to alter the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region.
Not everyone sees the Quad as a source of leverage against Beijing; critics argue that members’ geopolitical interests are too divergent to form a united front. Beijing, for its part, has called the alliance an attempt by Washington to build a “so-called Indo-Pacific NATO” that undermines the security of the region.
But Richard McGregor, a senior fellow focused on Chinese politics and foreign relations in Asia at Australia’s Lowy Institute, a think tank, is more of a believer. Yes, each Quad member has its own “dynamic and relations with China,” he says, but what the four nations have in common—the need to counter a more aggressive Beijing—is a powerful force too.
In an Eastworld Spotlight conversation with Fortune’s Clay Chandler, McGregor talks about U.S.-China relations under President Biden, the strengthening of the Quad alliance, and China’s growing assertiveness. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Fortune’s Clay Chandler: We’re just over a month into the Biden presidency. Do you think the U.S.-China relationship will be significantly different under Biden than it was under Trump?
Richard McGregor: It will be significantly different, but not significantly better. We are heading into a long-term contest between the U.S. and China. It’s multifaceted. It’s about technology, trade, economy, regional power, military, and maybe even a contest of systems about ideology.
I guess the area where it might be significantly different is whether the two sides can cooperate, while competing, on climate change and the pandemic. You got two individuals in Beijing and Washington—Xie Zhenhua and John Kerry—who have worked closely together and are very committed to the issue of climate change and tackling it. So I can see some possible cooperation there. The pandemic is a little bit more cloudy, obviously with all the U.S. criticisms over China and the [World Health Organization] investigation on the origins of the coronavirus.
Biden’s approach toward China includes rebuilding the U.S.’s relationship with its traditional allies. One grouping that’s getting a lot of attention lately is the Quad, a forum for the Indo-Pacific’s four largest democracies to discuss security issues. What do you make of Biden efforts to bolster the Quad?
I think we are actually going to see a lot of action from the Quad in the coming months. The foreign ministers just had a phone hookup, and it’s quite possible that we have a leaders’ meeting this year. The Quad was a loose partnership between these countries that was formed 10 or 12 years ago and then fell apart. The challenges from China are so much greater now, so that is really firming the Quad up.
Each of these Quad nations has its dynamic and relations with China. But I think the one thing they have in common is that they are all looking for options, or what we might call counter-leverage.
There are a lot of conversations on how military cooperation can be increased among these allied nations, even to the extent of involving India. Do you expect greater collaboration between India’s military and armed forces of the region’s other three democracies?
India has always been nonaligned and quite protectionist on the trade front. The border clashes with China last year have decisively changed the Indian thinking. They are not going to become a direct military ally, but there is deep disillusionment with China. The Indians have kind of lost trust [in China], and it will be very hard to rebuild it. They also will have to talk at the border; that’s difficult for both countries. India is looking for options. They have been closed to Japan for quite some time, getting closer to Australia, and the U.S. is very keen to build closer ties with India.
How does this look from inside the Chinese Communist Party? You see these conversations starting to take shape. Is Beijing worried about that or not?
China seems to be fighting with all Western countries. It’s been fighting with the U.K., France, Canada, U.S., Australia. Is this what China wants? Is this the aim of their policy? But then again China would say, “Oh really, you think we’re struggling? Look who’s losing. Look at us, our economy is growing, the only major economy to grow last year. We just had a big trade deal with Europe. We’re getting along very well with Southeast Asia. We got highly successful vaccine diplomacy being rolled out in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America.”
[China] seems to be really confident, thinking their system is working. They are incrementally going to be just pushing out the wagon wherever they can. And if countries do cross them like Australia, they will punish them. They are happy for other countries to see that happen.
This interview is part of Eastworld Spotlight, a series of conversations on matters of business, tech, and finance with executives, experts, entrepreneurs, and investors in Asia. Subscribe to Fortune’s Eastworld newsletter to get them in your inbox.