This ranking evaluates how Fortune 500 companies are deploying AI, and how technology leaders value those investments relative to industry peers.

Fortune AIQ 75

The companies on the Global 500 employ 70.2 million people, and their revenue represents more than one-third of the world’s GDP.

Fortune Global 500

With a combined revenue of $21 trillion and $2.1 trillion in profits, the 2026 Fortune 500 is the definitive list of America's largest companies.

Fortune 500

The 300 companies on this year’s list brought in over $12.5 trillion in revenue for the latest 12 months, with the median revenue figure at $24 billion.

America's Most Innovative Companies

AI is a major force shaping this year’s list—but it’s far from the only story.

World's Most Admired Companies

Fortune AIQ 50

The corporations on our annual list of the world's 500 largest companies combined to generate $41.7 trillion in revenue over the past year.

Almost $20 trillion in revenue—and a record-breaking $1.87 trillion in profits. Introducing the 2025 Fortune 500, the definitive list of the biggest companies in America.

The 300 companies on this year’s list brought in over $12.6 trillion in revenue for the latest 12 months, with the median revenue figure at $22 billion.

Leaders in all industries rely more than ever on Big Tech—and appreciate the giants that deliver, at scale, without drama.

The corporations on our annual list posted aggregate revenues of $41 trillion for the second year in a row.

Industries included in the sector are banks, insurance, and real estate companies.

Fortune Sector Leaders: Financials

The Fortune 500, in its 70th year in 2024, ranks the biggest U.S. companies by revenue.

The 200 companies on this list are transforming industries from the inside out.

The 26th edition of the list shows how much esteem Big Tech giants command among other business leaders.

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The 25th Fortune World’s Most Admired Companies list suggests that tech giants’ peers respect them as much as ever.

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The corporations on our annual list of the world’s largest companies delivered a record $41 trillion in aggregate revenues.

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The companies on this list are mobilizing the creative tools of capitalism to help solve social problems.

CTW 2023-

In the summer of 2013, Detroit hit economic rock-bottom. With the city’s population down more than 60% from its 1950s peak, and the auto industry still reeling from the Great Recession, the city declared bankruptcy; its unemployment rate at one point topped 25%. To help the city bounce back, JPMorgan Chase teamed up with local government, other employers, and nonprofits on Invested in Detroit, a program through which the company has poured over $200 million into Detroit’s economy in the form of job training, loans for small businesses, and real estate financing. The bank’s biggest innovations involved extending credit to entrepreneurs and property buyers who lacked the collateral or credit histories to qualify for traditional loans—a major problem in underserved and lower-income communities. To date, Invested in Detroit has helped place some 72,000 Detroiters into apprenticeships or jobs, while providing financing or technical aid to 13,000 small businesses. Detroit’s jobless rate is now just 6.4%. JPMorgan Chase, meanwhile, has benefited from a healthier economy: Since 2017, its numbers of consumer and business accounts, market share, and commercial lending in the metro area have all grown by double-digit percentages. And the bank has taken some of its innovations national: Its Entrepreneurs of Color Fund, first launched in Detroit, has made more than 2,100 loans, worth over $115 million, to entrepreneurs nationwide.

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The Fortune 500, in its 69th year in 2023, ranks the biggest U.S. companies by revenue.

F500 2023-JPMorgan Chase

The largest bank in the U.S. got even bigger in early 2023 after acquiring failed lender First Republic. It reported record revenues of $154.8 billion for 2022, up 22% from the year prior. 
<ul> 
 	<li>JPMorgan Chase acquired the $173 billion loan portfolio and $30 billion of securities held by First Republic in May 2023, after First Republic was seized by the federal government amid broader turmoil in the banking sector that started in March when Silicon Valley Bank experienced a run on its deposits.</li> 
 	<li>The bank posted $37.7 billion in profits for 2022. That was down 22% from the year prior, but still made JPMorgan Chase the most profitable commercial bank or financial services company on the Fortune 500.</li> 
</ul>

Just as it dominates our economy, Big Tech now dominates Fortune’s annual ranking of corporate reputation.

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Aggregate sales hit $37.8 trillion last year—an increase of 19%, the highest annual growth rate in the list’s history.

This year’s Fortune 500 marks the 68th running of the list.

F500 2022 JPMorganChase

A Wall Street boom fueled record profits for JPMorgan Chase in 2021: The company delivered $48.3 billion in earnings for the year, as fees from mergers and acquisitions and trading revenue swelled the bank’s margins. That said, the megabank’s leadership has signaled that the party could be winding down. CEO Jamie Dimon said in April 2022 that the global economy was facing “unprecedented” risks, warning that factors such as the war in Ukraine and high inflation could possibly lead to recession. In February 2022, JPMorgan Chase became the first commercial bank to enter the metaverse, setting up a virtual shop in the Metajuku mall. In the real-world workplace, the bank has been less bullish about virtual interaction, with Dimon urging reluctant employees to return full-time to the office.

After a year in which humanity leaned more heavily than ever on tech giants, see which companies topped Fortune's ranking of corporate reputation.

WMAC 2021-08-JPMorgan Chase

Total revenue for the world’s biggest companies fell 4.8% to $31.7 trillion this year—the first decline in half a decade.

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As COVID-19 began its global spread, CEO Jamie Dimon publicly worried there would be another great financial crisis. But despite the financial challenges faced by many Americans, the nation’s largest bank remained largely unfazed. In 2020, JPMorgan Chase posted record net revenues of $119.5 billion, though profits sank 20% from the year prior, owing in part to billions set aside to cover bad loans. One bright spot was JPMorgan’s markets revenues, which came in at a record $29.5 billion in 2020 as traders capitalized on volatile swings in the prices of stocks and other assets. Fees from the firm’s investment banking activities, meanwhile, rose 25%. In 2021, Dimon is singing quite a different tune to shareholders: He has predicted a “boom” that could “easily run into 2023.” Indeed, the firm has started to release some of those loan loss reserves it built up in 2020—a vote of confidence that the recovery has truly taken hold.

This year’s Fortune 500 marks the 67th running of the list.

F500-2021-19-JPMorgan Chase

For an astounding 13th straight year, Apple claims the top spot in Fortune’s annual ranking of corporate reputation, based on a survey of almost 3,800 executives, directors, and analysts.

This year's Fortune Global 500 generated $33.3 trillion in revenues and $2.1 trillion in profits.

G500-2020-038-JPMorgan

As the U.S. plunged into a pandemic-related recession this year, the nation’s largest bank was armed with an exceptionally strong balance sheet. JPMorgan Chase moved up three spots in the rankings from last year, thanks to a 6% increase in net revenue to a record $118.7 billion, with $2.7 trillion in assets. The company posted $36.4 billion in net income—its ninth record result in the past 10 years. However, the outlook for 2020 is less bullish thanks to the coronavirus crisis. CEO Jamie Dimon issued a warning to shareholders: Best-case scenario, he predicted, the pandemic will create “financial stress similar to the global financial crisis of 2008,” including a “meaningful” hit to profits.

This year's Fortune 500 marks the 66th running of the list.

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Heading into a recession in 2020, the nation’s largest bank is armed with a strong balance sheet. JPMorgan Chase moved up one spot from last year, thanks to a 6% increase in net revenue to a record $118.7 billion, with $2.7 trillion in assets. The company posted $36.4 billion in net income—the ninth record result in the past 10 years. However, this year looks different. Since the coronavirus crisis began, CEO Jamie Dimon issued a warning to shareholders: Best-case scenario, he predicted, the pandemic will create “financial stress similar to the global financial crisis of 2008,” including a “meaningful” hit to profits.

Here are the World's Most Admired Companies for 2019 as ranked in their industries. See who made the list.

This year's Fortune Global 500 generated $27.7 trillion in revenues and $1.5 trillion in profits.

This year's Fortune 500 marks the 65th running of the list.

These 52 companies from across the globe are doing well by doing good.

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This year's Fortune 500 marks the 64th running of the list.

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Business insiders have spoken: Asked which companies they most admire, more than 4,100 executives, directors, and analysts chose these top 50 All-Stars.

The world's 500 largest companies generated $31.2 trillion in revenues and $1.7 trillion in profits in 2014. Together, this year's Fortune Global 500 employ 65 million people worldwide and are represented by 36 countries.

This year's Fortune 500 marks the 61st running of the list. Wal-Mart claims the top spot again. See who made the list.

Global business is back. After limping through a worldwide financial crisis and economic slowdown, the 500 largest companies ranked by revenues shattered all sorts of performance records in 2013: They racked up combined revenues of $31.1 trillion, up 2.5% from 2012, and profits soared 27% to nearly $2 trillion. China’s 95 companies (up from 89 last year) posted $5.8 trillion in revenues. The U.S. has four fewer companies on the list than last year but remains (for now) the country leader, with 128 corporations on the list—including No. 1 Wal-Mart Stores—reporting $8.6 trillion in revenues. 

Wal-Mart stayed on top as its sales crept closer to half-a-trillion dollars. Apple moved into the top five. And UnitedHealth Group continued its steady climb. 

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JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co. is the largest of the United States’ “Big Four” banks and a global financial-services company headquartered in New York City. Its principal businesses include Consumer &amp; Community Banking; Commercial &amp; Investment Banking; and Asset &amp; Wealth Management, alongside corporate functions. The present company was created through the 2000 merger of J.P. Morgan &amp; Co. and Chase Manhattan Corporation, and it also reflects the histories of firms including Bank One, Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Hanover, and Washington Mutual. Jamie Dimon has served as chairman and CEO since 2006, leading the bank through the 2008 global financial crisis; in 2026, Doug Petno and Troy Rohrbaugh were named co-presidents as the bank continues its CEO-succession planning.

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JPMorgan Chase (JPM): Company Profile, Stock Price, News, Rankings

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JPMorgan Chase

jpmorgan chase

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's Fourth Quarter 2025 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. Your line will be muted for the duration of the call. We will now go live to the presentation. The presentation is available on JPMorgan Chase's website. Please refer to the disclaimer in the back concerning forward-looking statements. Please stand by. At this time, I would now like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon, and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

Thank you and good morning, everyone. This quarter, the firm reported net income of $13 billion and EPS of $4.63, with an ROTCE of 18%. These results included the previously announced reserve build of $2.2 billion in CCB related to the forward purchase commitment of the Apple Card portfolio. Revenue of $46.8 billion was up 7% year on year on higher markets revenue, as well as higher asset management fees and auto lease income. The increase in NII ex-Markets was primarily driven by higher firm-wide deposit balances and revolving balances in card, largely offset by the impact of lower rates. Expenses of $24 billion were up 5% year on year, predominantly driven by higher volume and revenue-related expenses and compensation growth, including front office hiring, partially offset by the release of an FDIC special assessment accrual.

Turning to the full year results, I'll remind you that there were a few significant items in 2025 which are listed in the footnote. Excluding those items, the firm reported full year net income of $57.5 billion, EPS of $20.18, revenue of $185 billion, with an ROTCE of 20%. And in terms of the balance sheet, we ended the quarter with a standardized CET1 ratio of 14.5%, down 30 basis points versus the prior quarter, as net income was more than offset by capital distributions and higher RWA. This quarter's higher standardized RWA is driven by increases in lending across both wholesale and retail, including the Apple Card purchase commitment, which contributed about $23 billion of standardized RWA, partially offset by lower market risk RWA. You'll see that sequentially, the advanced RWA is up more significantly than standardized.

As you know, our SCB is now at the 2.5% floor, which makes advanced RWA more relevant, so we have added it to the page. The Apple Card transaction's advanced RWA contribution was about $110 billion, based on the sum of expected drawn balances and undrawn lines on closing. The elevated level of advanced RWA is temporary and is expected to reduce to approximately $30 billion in the near term. Moving to our businesses, CCB reported net income of $3.6 billion, or $5.3 billion, excluding the reserve build for the Apple Card portfolio. Revenue of $19.4 billion was up 6% year on year, predominantly driven by higher NII on higher revolving balances in card and a higher deposit margin in banking and wealth management. A few points to highlight: consumers and small businesses remain resilient.

We continue to monitor leading indicators for any signs of stress, and despite weak consumer sentiment, trends in our data are largely consistent with historical norms, and we are not currently seeing deterioration. Across income groups, debit and credit sales volume continued to perform well, up 7% year on year. For the full year, we had strong growth in our franchise with 1.7 million net new checking accounts, 10.4 million new card accounts, and record households in wealth management across digital and advised channels. Next, the CIB reported net income of $7.3 billion. Revenue of $19.4 billion was up 10% year on year, driven by higher revenues in markets, payments, and Security Services. To give a bit more color, IB fees were down 5% year on year, reflecting a strong prior year compare and the timing of some deals that were pushed to 2026.

In terms of the outlook, we expect strong client engagement and deal activity in 2026, supported by constructive market dynamics, which is reflected in our pipeline. Markets Fixed Income was up 7% year on year, with strong performance in securitized products, rates, and currencies in emerging markets, largely offset by lower revenue in credit trading. Equities was up 40%, with robust performance across the franchise, particularly in prime. Turning to asset and wealth management, AWM reported net income of $1.8 billion, with pre-tax margin of 38%. Revenue of $6.5 billion was up 13% year on year, predominantly driven by growth in management fees on higher average market levels and strong net inflows, as well as higher performance fees. Long-term net inflows were $52 billion for the quarter and $209 billion for the full year, positive across all channels, regions, and asset classes.

In liquidity, we saw net inflows of $105 billion for the quarter and $183 billion for the year. And we saw record client asset net inflows of $553 billion for the year. To finish up the fourth quarter results, corporate reported net income of $307 million and revenue of $1.5 billion. Before I cover the outlook, I want to make a few points on non-bank financial institution lending, given the attention it received last quarter. When we look at NBFI lending internally, we use a narrower definition than what the call report uses. Our definition focuses on exposure to non-bank financial institutions that is collateralized by the loans the NBFIs are making to end borrowers.

At the top of the page, we've provided a reconciliation of the regulatory definition to our definition, and as you can see, that results in excluding, for example, subscription lending to private equity funds, resulting in about $160 billion of exposure as of the fourth quarter. We've also given you categories of the exposure that we believe are a bit more intuitive and map to recognizable industry categories and business models of the NBFIs. Now, looking at the bottom left, you can see that even though our narrower definition produces a smaller absolute number, the growth over the last seven years has been quite significant, no matter how you look at it. And the drivers of that growth are well understood in terms of market dynamics and regulatory pressures.

In terms of risk, on the bottom right of the page, we've given you some detail on the structural features associated with different versions of this lending and the different asset classes. Given the significant amount of credit enhancement involved in this activity, as well as the absence of a traditional credit cycle during the period, it's not surprising that when we look at the loss history since 2018, we've only seen one charge-off, one related to apparent fraud. Stepping back, in light of the growth and the novel elements of some components of this activity, we are quite mindful of the risks, but given the structural protections, you would generally expect losses in this NBFI category to appear either as a result of additional instances of fraud-like problems or as a result of a particularly deep recession that erodes all the credit enhancement.

In that scenario, losses associated with traditional lending to end borrowers would likely be the greater concern for the industry. Now, turning to the outlook for 2026, we continue to expect NII ex-Markets to be about $95 billion. The drivers we explained the last quarter remain largely the same, so I'll cover them quickly. As usual, the outlook follows the forward curve, which currently assumes two rate cuts, offsetting that as the expectation for continued loan growth in card will go slightly less than last year as the revolve normalization tailwind is behind us, as well as modest firm-wide deposit growth. For completeness, we expect total NII to be about $103 billion for the year, as a function of Markets NII increasing to about $8 billion due to lower funding costs from the rate cuts, which you should think of as being primarily offset in NIR.

On expense, as we told you at an industry conference in December, we expect 2026 adjusted expense to be about $105 billion. Broadly, the expense growth continues to align with where we see the greatest opportunities across our businesses. The details of the thematic drivers are listed on the page and are broadly consistent with what we've told you before. On the slide, we've shown you 2024 and 2025, as well as 2026, and called out the Foundation contribution and the FDIC special assessment. When adjusting for those, the 2026 growth looks a bit more in line. Still, 2026 in isolation clearly represents meaningful expense growth in both dollar and percentage terms, and that growth reflects our structural optimism about the opportunity set for the company when we look through the cycle, as well as some optimism about the near-term revenue outlook.

More generally, the environment is only getting more competitive, and so it remains critical to ensure that we are making the necessary investments to secure our position against both traditional and non-traditional competitors. To wrap up, on credit, we expect the 2026 card net charge-off rate to be approximately 3.4% on favorable delinquency trends driven by the continued resilience of the consumer. We're now happy to take your questions, so let's open the line for Q&A.

Thank you. Please stand by. Our first question comes from the line of Glenn Schorr with Evercore. Your line is open.

Hi, thanks very much. So I want to ask on the stablecoin issue. This week, we're going to have some markups and talk in Congress. I saw the ABA letter this week talking about the immediacy of the issue and whether or not they can close the loophole on interest on stablecoin. And I think they estimated that, or Treasury estimated that it's like $6.6 trillion of bank deposits could be at risk if they don't close that loophole. So my question is, it was written from the ABA standpoint, the community bank standpoint. Is there any reason why it wouldn't be all banks, you specifically? And then how big of a deal for the banking system if they're not successful closing that hole? Because it does put people at risk of not having insurance and all that stuff. So I'll let you all opine. Thanks.

Right. Okay. Thanks, Glenn. I guess I'll start by saying you probably know more about this than I do, and I think Marianne is really the expert at this point, and she did give some comments about this at a recent industry conference, but I'll give you my brief take, broken into a couple of pieces, so one, it's worth saying, although it's not directly responsive to your question, that as a company, we've been quite involved in the whole blockchain technology space for some time, and through our Kinexys offering, we're doing a bunch of kind of really cool stuff across both wholesale. As you know, we launched our first tokenized money market fund, and so that's a capability that we've developed over a long period of time.

We have really cutting-edge thinkers in there, and we're kind of using that kind of across the whole company as we engage more in that ecosystem. On a related point, also, I think in CCB, we're plugging in a little bit more to the crypto ecosystem. And we have an agreement with Coinbase, and it's going to be possible to buy crypto in the CCB ecosystem too. So I say that all by way of saying that we see the interesting developments in the space, the technological innovation. We're engaged. We're watching. We care.

I would just add one quick thing. That letter was signed by the ABA, the FSF, the ICBA. It was all banks. It wasn't a handful of banks.

Okay. I didn't actually know that, so helpful. And I think that what I was going to say narrowly about that point is I think it's a two-part answer to your question. One, I think it's very clear, and it's in the spirit of the GENIUS Act legislation and everything that we're advocating for, that the creation of a parallel banking system that sort of has all the features of banking, including something that looks a lot like a deposit that pays interest, without sort of the associated prudential safeguards that have been developed over hundreds of years of bank regulation, is an obviously dangerous and undesirable thing. And so that is the core of our advocacy. On your narrow question of, if this doesn't turn out the way we're arguing it should, what is the risk to banking system deposits?

I actually think that's a pretty complicated question, and it involves a lot of nuances about where does the money come from, where does it go, what securities are purchased, from whom, what is the impact on system-wide deposits, and how does that sort of move between consumer and wholesale. But clearly, there is some risk for some firms, maybe for many firms, and some version of a threat to the business model. And I think we always embrace competition, so this is not about saying that we don't want to compete, but it's about avoiding the creation of a parallel ecosystem that has all the same economic properties and risks without appropriate regulation.

And the final point to say, I guess, is that in the end, all of our thinking around this from a customer perspective and from an investment and from a franchise perspective is organized around the question of what actual benefit does the consumer get. So as much as the technology is cool and there's interesting stuff there, in the end, you have to ask yourself, how does this actually make the consumer experience better? And in the cases where it does, we either need to get involved or improve our own service offering. In the case where it doesn't, sometimes it's a little bit of a solution in search of a problem. So I think the question of the risk to existing business models and banking system deposits needs to be looked at through that lens.

But it's obviously an important question, and our CCB folks are spending a lot of time on it.

I appreciate that. I have a very short, narrow follow-up. You noted the 1.7 million net new checking accounts opened for the year, and deposit growth is small, but I also noted the 17% growth in client investment assets. Is that all of it, or are there other things at play that's limiting deposit growth despite all this great checking account growth?

Oh, interesting. So I think what you're saying implicitly is the reason that the growth in checking account balances is relatively muted that sort of investment flows are competing that away in some sense? Good question. I would say partially, but not really. I guess the broader narrative is about sort of a tension between the very robust franchise growth, which you've alluded to with the 1.7 million net new accounts, offset against the persistence, albeit at a much lower level of yield-seeking flows. So to the extent that you consider flows into investments, yield-seeking flows, I think there is a relationship between the two. But I would probably put more traditional yield-seeking flows higher up the list relative to investments, but it's clearly both.

And so, yeah, as we talked about over the prior few quarters, the level of yield-seeking flows dropped off a lot, but it's not zero. As we talked about last quarter, when you combine that with a slightly lower savings rate and a couple of other dynamics, that sort of moment where we were expecting the balance per account number in CCB to start growing again has just been pushed out a little bit. That's the reason that we talked about previously, I think last quarter, that our expectations for consumer deposit growth in 2026 are lower than they had been in our scenario analysis at Investor Day, and that remains the case.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Ken Usdin with Autonomous. Your line is open.

Thanks. Hi, good morning. Jeremy mentioned when you were talking about the expense outlook that there's obviously part of the investment cycle there. You mentioned that the revenue growth outlook in there also looks pretty good. I was just wondering, and we can see that in the volume-based parts of the growth. But I'm just wondering, you have your NII outlook, we have your expenses. Just what parts of the fees are you expecting to be strong? You mentioned some deals pushed out in IB. If you can kind of just help us flavor, kind of understand just where the biggest drivers of fee revenue growth are going to be as you look across the businesses to help us kind of fill in a little bit. Thank you.

Yeah, good question. And I sort of chose my words carefully there because I think there are two versions of this in terms of expenses and investments in terms of short-term versus long-term. So narrowly, when you look at 2026, we do show you there volume and revenue-related expense, which what we traditionally describe as good expense. And certainly, that is a driver of the overall growth and expenses. We do also note in there that a significant chunk of that is auto lease depreciation, which is essentially should be thought of as primarily a counter-revenue item or whatever. So there's some optimism about the fee environment embedded there. So to answer your question directly, breaking down 2026, I obviously don't want to kind of break our tradition of not guiding on fees/NIR given how market-dependent they are and volatile they are.

But you won't be surprised to hear that we're obviously optimistic on investment banking fees generally. I would say on markets, we're very optimistic about the franchise and the environment is quite supportive, but it was an exceptionally strong year this year. So as we always say in markets, the number will be whatever it'll be, and we'll fight to make it as big as possible. And on the rest of the kind of fee items, the sort of broad wealth management, asset management across both CCB and AWM, again, we're very optimistic about the position of the franchise there and the associated implications for fees. But we're a little bit cautious about sort of market appreciation drivers given kind of where we're launching from and given the type of year that it's been this year.

So it's a little bit of a balanced story, I would say, in terms of fee outlook for 2026, not for any particular negative reason, but just because 2025 was so exceptionally strong, and then just to briefly pivot to the larger point, the distinction I'm drawing too is the relationship between 2026 projected expense growth and the associated 2026 revenues versus the broader category of investments in long-term growth of the franchise, kind of the top bar of the page across bankers, branches, product capabilities, etc., which is also a reflection of optimism, but long-term optimism that this is a franchise that rewards investment across all of its parts.

Excellent. Thank you for that, Jeremy. And the follow-up, that balancing act also is. I think you guys have been more than fine not counting on positive operating leverage every year. How do you balance where your efficiency ratio versus your ROE outputs are, given that you're still in this really strong upper teens zone that is obviously still generating tons of capital and allowing you to do a lot with the company?

Yeah. I mean, I guess I would sort of anchor my answer on that one on the word output that you used. So on a couple of dimensions. So if you remember my Investor Day presentation, we talked a little bit about the way that we think about capital deployment sort of across the descending stack of marginal return opportunities and the fact that we will very much deploy large amounts of capital below 17% because the alternative is to buy back stock at implied returns that are much, much, much lower than that. And that's a good thing, and we don't apologize for that, and we think it's shareholder accretive.

And so for that reason, we really are starting to pivot much more to really discuss the through-the-cycle ROTCE target as simply an output of our overall business strategy and the intelligent deployment of our financial resources and our investments across the entire opportunity set. And in some respects, that's also true about the efficiency ratio. In the end, we do what we need to do to compete. We're going to invest what we need to invest to secure the future of the company and to drive the revenue growth that we need to drive. And as long as what we're doing is still expected to be long-term profitable, in some sense, the efficiency ratio is a bit of an output.

Jamie always says that perennially expanding, the notion of constant operating leverage mathematically implies perennially expanding margins, which is an obvious impossibility in a highly competitive business that we operate in. It is a good sanity check. When that number drifts high, maybe you have to look a little harder at your expenses and make sure that everything that you're doing is what you want it to be with the maximum possible efficiency. We sort of do that all the time anyway. That's what I would say in response to that.

I would just add that capital is invested to get a good return through the cycle, which means sometimes you have a better efficiency ratio, sometimes you have a worse efficiency ratio. It's kind of more of an outcome of the decisions you make.

Thank you. Our next question comes from John McDonald with Truist Securities. Your line is open.

Thanks. Good morning. I wanted to ask a little bit about the credit card business. I mean, I guess first, in terms of the Apple Card acquisition, maybe you could talk about the attraction of that business to you guys, both the actual book and also what you're hoping to get out of the co-brand partnership and the platform more broadly.

Yeah, absolutely. So let me start by pointing out what I think is obvious, but it's worth saying in light of how much attention this deal has gotten, which is that, as you say, from a narrow perspective, just in terms of the portfolio and the transaction, this is an economically compelling transaction for us as a co-brand deal. And I think someone described it as a win-win-win for all three parties. And I think that's very much how we feel about it. So that's a good starting point. And then in addition to that, obviously, you're talking here about a partnership with a firm, Apple, that is a leader in payments innovation and user experience. And it's obviously a very compelling distribution channel for card. And so it's going to be challenging for us. The integration is going to take two years for a reason.

We feel confident that we'll get it done successfully. And I think the process of getting it done in the narrow sense is going to make us better, just generally accelerate and challenge our modernization agenda and the user-friendliness of everything that we do in the card business. And beyond that, we'll see. We'll see what comes out of the partnership. But obviously, anyone should be thrilled to be in a partnership with Apple.

Okay. Thanks, Jeremy. And then maybe you or Jamie could provide some thoughts on the idea of regulators putting caps on credit card APRs, just potential impacts on the industry and how you would think through strategic reactions as a big issuer?

Yeah. Thanks, John. And I appreciate the way you framed the question because the thing that I'm sort of trying to avoid doing is spend a lot of energy or time speculating on the probability that this does or doesn't happen in whatever form it does or doesn't happen. So I think for the purposes of this call, and obviously, you can assume that institutionally we'll be doing all the relevant contingency planning. But for the purposes of this call, given how little we know at this point, the way I would prefer to talk about it is just assume for the sake of argument that something in the general mode of price controls on credit card interest rates goes through, what would be the consequences of that?

And I think the first thing to say, which you obviously know very well, is that the card ecosystem is an exceptionally competitive ecosystem. It's among the most competitive businesses that we operate in. And that's true for all levels of borrower credit score from a high-FICO to low-FICO. And so in that context, just basic economics, when you start with that as your starting point, the right assumption about what the response of the system is going to be to the imposition of price controls is not that you will simply compress the profit margins, which are already at their sort of competitively optimal level, and thereby pass on benefits to consumers. What's actually simply going to happen is that the provision of the service will change dramatically.

Specifically, people will lose access to credit on a very, very extensive and broad basis, especially the people who need it the most, ironically, and so that's a pretty severely negative consequence for consumers and, frankly, probably also a negative consequence for the economy as a whole right now. I don't want to let this pass without saying that I think it should be obvious that that would also be bad for us. I'm not going to get into quantifying, but in a narrow sense, this is a big business for us. It's a very competitive business, but we wouldn't be in it if it weren't a good business for us, and in a world where price controls make it no longer a good business, that would present a significant challenge, clearly.

Beyond that, the way we actually respond would have a lot to do with the details, and I just don't think we have enough information at this point.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Betsy Graseck with Morgan Stanley. Your line is open.

Hi. Good morning. Okay. So one follow-up to the last question is, does it impact how you're thinking about the co-brand cards you have, the rewards card? Because I think one of the media narratives here is that it would impact only revolvers. And I'm wondering if that's a view that you share, or is this an impact on the entirety of the card book?

Look, obviously, it would impact prime less than subprime. It would be dramatic on subprime, and some of those co-brands, there are a lot of subprime, etc., so you really have to go co-brand by co-brand, but you would have to adjust your model for the added risk by this and ongoing price controls and things like that. So if it happened the way it was described, it would be dramatic. If it happens in a way it was modified quite a bit, it would be less, and we don't know the number yet, but it would be very dramatic if it was just a cap.

And then on the Apple Card two years to bring on, Jeremy, you mentioned for good reason. Is this primarily a function of the technology that Apple Card was built on, right? So as far as I'm aware, the current offering had a built-for-purpose technology stack. And I understand, I guess my question is for you. Are you building out a whole new technology to enable that same interface with the users of Apple Card, or are you able to enhance your current system to enable the users to come onto your current system, or is it under a whole new tech stack? Or are there other reasons why it's a two-year process?

There are no other reasons. If it was a traditional credit card thing, we could fold it in rather quickly and just put it in our systems. But it's not. They actually built a completely different integrated into iOS tech stack. And they did a good job. So it's good stuff. But we have to integrate that inside our system. And to do that, it's going to take two years and cost a bit of money to meet the terms and standards. Those terms and standards are actually quite good. We looked at them and said, "No, that's good. Apple wants to take very good care of those customers." And a lot of those things will be built directly into our system. And we could obviously apply some of that customer service stuff in other places. And we want to do it right. And that's all it is.

We have to rebuild what their tech stack is embedded into our system.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Erika Najarian with UBS. Your line is open.

Hi. Good morning. My first question is for Jamie. Jamie, investors were feeling quite optimistic about the fundamental macro opportunities for the banks in 2026, paired with deregulation, of course. And I think this weekend sort of shook their confidence given the social media post by Biden about credit card rate caps and, of course, additionally, the DOJ subpoenas to Chair Powell. And investors kept saying over the weekend, "We can't wait to hear what Jamie has to say about the 2026 outlook." So if you could start there in terms of how you're seeing the macro backdrop unveil in 2026 for the banking industry and how you're considering the risks, whether it's executive overreach or the geopolitical situation at the moment.

Yeah. So I mean, I'll answer the question, but I think when you're guessing what the macro environment is going to be, if you asked me in the short run, call it six months and nine months and even a year, it's pretty positive. Consumers have money. There's still jobs, even though it's weakened a little bit. There's a lot of stimulus coming from the one big beautiful bill. Deregulation is a plus in general, not just for banks, but banks will be able to redeploy capital. But the backdrop is also important, but the timetables are different. Geopolitical is an enormous amount of risk. And I don't have to go through each part of it. It's just a big amount of risk that may or may not be determining the fate of the economy.

The deficits in the United States and around the world are quite large. We don't know when that's going to bite. It will bite eventually because you can't just keep on borrowing money endlessly. And so early on, fine. Who knows? And of course, we have to deal with the world we got, not the world we want. And I've never... we don't guess about the outcome. We serve clients. We serve them left and right. And we'll deal and navigate with the politics and the issues that we have to deal with around the world and stuff like that. And we're comfortable. We can build our business. I do think if you look at things, the rising tide's lifting all boats a little bit. I'm quite conscious of that and how I look at the numbers, at least.

But that doesn't mean it's not going to stop this year.

Got it. And my follow-up question is for you, Jeremy. Underneath the $95 billion of NII ex-Markets for the year, could you give us a sense of what kind of balance sheet growth you think is underpinning that? And maybe some commentary on how you're thinking about deposit growth in 2026 relative to your earlier commentary about yield-seeking flows and how those statistics would compare to balance sheet growth of 8% in 2025 and average deposit growth of 5% in 2025.

Sure. So I mean, not to be pedantic here, Erica, but I'm going to pivot away from balance sheet growth per se and just talk about loans and deposits, recognizing that some non-trivial portion of balance sheet growth is coming from inside of markets these days and the name on that stuff is variable and also not part of the NII ex-markets. But taking a step back in terms of the big sort of balance sheet drivers and growth and mix drivers of the NII, number one, as the slide says and as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, card loan growth is still a driver. I think we're expecting something like 6% or 7% card loan growth for 2026. So that is lower than we've seen recently, obviously, but we've been talking about that for some time as a function of the normalization of the revolver account.

So that as a tailwind is largely behind us. And what we have now is just growth from overall system growth and consumer balance sheet growth as well as our optimism about share and client engagement and customer engagement across the card ecosystem. So that's one important loan driver. On the deposit side, starting with wholesale, 2025 was an exceptionally strong year for wholesale deposit growth. So as we look to 2026, we're still pretty optimistic about the wholesale deposit franchise and the payments franchise products, offerings, customer engagement, growth opportunities, etc. But it's going to be tough to beat the 2025 performance in wholesale deposit growth. So we have a more modest expectation for 2026 wholesale deposit growth.

And then I touched a little bit on what we're thinking about consumer deposit growth earlier, but just to reiterate, the narrative there is that the balance between what is very robust engagement and franchise success manifested through the 1.7 million net new accounts that were originated this year and the fact that the balances per account are sort of not growing quite as fast as we'd thought earlier in the year as a function of yield-seeking flows that are much, much lower than they were at the peak, but are still not exactly zero. So there's a kind of tension between those two things.

At this point, we're sort of expecting that inflection in balance per account to kick in in the second half of 2026, at which point you would start to see kind of a reassertion of the consumer deposit growth, which would get us to modest deposit growth for CCB in 2026, but certainly lower than that 6% scenario that we talked about at Investor Day, which is stuff we already told you about last quarter and that Marianne has discussed. Can I just add one more? Can I add one more factor? Which is the Fed. They don't call it QE, but they're talking about doing $40 billion a month of buying T-bills. That adds $40 billion a month into bank, all things being equal to bank reserves. Most of that initially shows up in wholesale deposits and then maybe gets redeployed.

So we'll see how that plays out too. But it does create more liquidity in the system, which I should have mentioned is another tailwind for the economy. Yeah. No, that's exactly right. And I think in our sort of accrued framework, as Jamie says, would initially tend to assume that that growth in system-wide deposits would accrue to extremely high-beta wholesale deposits and is therefore not going to tend to be a big driver of the NII story year on year, but it's significant in terms of the system and the functioning of the money market.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Gerard Cassidy with RBC Capital Markets. Your line is open.

Good morning, Jeremy. Good morning, Jamie. Jeremy, thank you for the.

Thank you for the data around the NBFI portfolio. Can you share with us an expansion? You talked about the growth over the last seven years has been significant and the drivers of the growth are the market dynamics and regulatory pressures. Can you expand upon that to give us a little more color of what's behind that?

Yeah. Oh, you want to take that? Go ahead, Jamie.

Well, look, it is. We obviously do things that we think are safe and proper and stuff like that, but it is arbitrage. We participate in that. We're better from regulatory capital holding AAA piece of something on top of something else as opposed to doing the direct loan itself. That's what it is. It's also arbitrage between banks and insurance companies and stuff like that. And that leads to some of that growth. One of the things I always tell the regulators is when you see arbitrage, you should look at it and always ask the question, "Why?" and ask, "Are you better off doing it that way as opposed to another way?"

There's nothing mystical about the loans that all these NBFIs are making.

And this stuff has been going on for a long period of time. It's just bigger now.

Yeah. Exactly. On the point of nothing mystical, my version of that, Gerard, and part of the reason that I chose those words in the prepared remarks is to ask the question, "Well, what's the narrative here if you go back in terms of regulation and competitive dynamics with the private credit ecosystem in particular and what has led to what and how has that all evolved?" And I think it's well understood that in addition to the regulatory capital factors, there were also the leveraged lending guidelines, which really did meaningfully constrain bank lending into this type of space when those were released. And I think there's an argument to say that that seeded or accelerated the growth of this ecosystem in ways that otherwise might not have happened.

But at some level, that is what it is. And I think as we've been talking about for the last couple of years, there's no reason that we can't compete head-to-head in that space. So the whole direct lending initiative and the realization that in many cases what sponsors want is a quick execution of a unitranche structure where they don't have to negotiate with a syndicate, but other times they want to go through the syndication process. And that's why we really leaned into this whole product-agnostic strategy that we talk about. And at the same time, in the cases where we don't wind up being the lender, yeah, sometimes we're competing with these folks. Sometimes they're our clients. Sometimes they're both. And done properly, as we talk about on the slide, we're very happy to be lenders to them.

So it's all part of a competitive partner ecosystem. And yeah, we just wanted to frame it out a little bit given all the questions last quarter.

No, that was very helpful. Appreciate it. As a follow-up question, you guys obviously have given us the guidance for NII with and without markets. And when you go back to the markets number in 2024, I think you guys put up about $1 billion in revenues. You show us 2025 at $3.3 billion. And market conditions, of course, will impact your guidance on the $8 billion. But what's the strategy of growing that business from where it was in 2024 to where we are today?

Yeah. Good question. So a couple of things about this. So number one, broadly speaking, over short periods of time, that markets NII number is going to fluctuate primarily as a function of rates and is liability sensitive. So in other words, at higher rates, the number is lower. So what we saw, if you sort of and we show the number every quarter. If you plot the evolution of that number as a function of the policy rate, you're going to see that relationship very strongly.

It's also true. I've pointed out in different moments that part of the reason that we emphasize it is that if there are particular mix changes in any given moment, Brazilian futures versus cash or something, high interest rate countries, you can get pretty big swings in the number in ways that have essentially no bottom line impact, which is the reason we de-emphasize the change. But third piece is just that, as has been noted, the Markets balance sheet has grown a lot over time. And so as we extend more financing to clients, the size of this effect gets bigger, which is all the more reason that we find it useful to carve it out and make it clear that in general, short-term fluctuations don't have any bottom line impact. And Jamie wanted to add something.

We don't run the business at all trying to grow NII in particular because we just look at the revenues created by the trade. Sometimes NII, sometimes it's a net revenue. But growing the business is important. We have the best FICC business in the world, one of the best equity businesses in the world. We have extraordinary people around the world. And we grow the business by building technology, adding research, adding sales, doing a better job in parts of the world where we don't have a great market share, but someone else is doing better than us. So we're going to grow that business. We're quite good at it. It's critical to the capital markets of the world. And the capital markets of the world are going to grow dramatically over the next 20 years. So that's how we build the business.

NII is just an outcome in itself, almost irrelevant.

Thank you. Our next question comes from Mike Mayo with Wells Fargo Securities. Your line is open.

Hi. I think I get it. JPMorgan spends for growth. You're getting growth, up 7% year over year in the fourth quarter, and you're willing to sacrifice returns for more growth, I guess because that increases SVA, but it is a wow, the $9 billion increase in expenses, your guide, year over year, and I get it that some of that is simply because revenues are likely to come in higher than expected, but if we could please have some more details on the rest, this is the first time we have a chance to address that $9 billion increase in expense guide, so maybe some areas. Jeremy, as far as tech spending, I think you went up $17 billion-$18 billion last year. Went up even more after you include the savings that you achieved, and especially since your post-peak modernization.

Where do you expect tech spend to be in 2026? And as it relates to AI, what was your spend last year and where do you expect that to go and what sort of payoffs? And then Jamie, since you're upping the bar, upping the stakes with the $9 billion of investments, the degree of your confidence that you're going to get the desired returns and outcomes from that? Thank you.

So tell you this, we're not going to give Mike, we owe you all as shareholders as much information we can give you, but we're not going to give you information which I think puts us at a competitive disadvantage. So we've been quite blunt with you guys. First of all, we try to put everything in there, everything. So even the Apple spending was in there. Inflation is in there. The expectation that revenues might go up is in there. So if revenues don't go up, that number won't be as big. But for the most part, and tech is going to go up. But the good news is when we look at the world, we see huge opportunity. And we're opening rural branches, which we think will be good. We're opening more branches in foreign countries. We're building better payment systems.

JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Q4 2025 Earnings Call Transcript

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