“Merzoni” isn’t a neologism that easily trips off the tongue, and it hasn’t fully taken hold in the world of European politics.
Yet, for months, a pragmatic alliance between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been building.
And despite the politicians being, in many ways, unlikely partners, the union has quietly been redefining Europe’s power balance. In the latest display of this dynamic, a joint-policy paper drawn up by Merz and Meloni is set to be delivered to European Union partners at an informal summit on Feb. 12, 2026, urging reforms to improve the bloc’s competitiveness.
As a scholar of European politics, history and culture, I see the union as being born of necessity but nonetheless serving the interests of both parties – and possibly those of the European Union, too.
Moving on from ‘Merkron’
Post-war European politics has seen the center of its gravity move before, but it has largely revolved around shifts to and from France or Germany, the bloc’s current two largest economies. The U.K.’s ability to dominate EU politics was always stymied by its lateness to the “European project” and ambivalence at home. And it was ended outright by a referendum in 2016 that saw the U.K.’s exit from the union.
For nearly a decade after Britain’s exit, Europe revolved around the axis of Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Emmanuel Macron, an alliance given the nickname “Merkron”: Merkel’s clumsy charm and cautious pragmatism paired with Macron’s charisma and sweeping European idealism. Their dual-stewardship helped steer the EU through Brexit, Donald Trump’s first presidency and the pandemic.
But times have changed.
Merkel is gone. She stepped down as German chancellor in December 2021. Macron, meanwhile, has struggled politically at home and increasingly resembles what diplomats and journalists describe as a European “Cassandra”: right in his warnings about global instability, yet less able to mobilize support domestically or across the continent to confront the issues.
The end of the “Merkron” era coincided with myriad crises confronting Europe, including Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, current U.S. unpredictability, growing climate pressures, never-stopping migration tensions and the collapse of arms-control regimes.
The comforting post-Cold War assumption that peace in Europe was permanent has vanished.
An unlikely partnership
Into this vacuum stepped Merz and Meloni. At first glance, the pairing looks odd.
Merz is a conservative Atlanticist and unapologetic economic liberal. His message, and the title of his 2008 book, “Dare More Capitalism,” signals a move toward an assertive pro-market agenda after years of cautious centrism under Merkel. Merz insists Germany must rebuild military capacity – a departure from decades of both German domestic and EU-wide reticence toward such a move.
Meloni, meanwhile, rose to power from Italy’s nationalist right. The lineage of her home party, Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, traces back to the rump of Mussolini’s fascists. Yet in office, she has proved politically agile, repositioning herself as a responsible and quite successful European actor. Meloni as prime minister has maintained support for Ukraine and cooperation with the European Union – shrugging off concerns over both areas prior to her coming to power. She has equally skillfully cultivated strong ties with Washington – including Trump’s political camp, and overall has demonstrated successful strategic chameleonism.
Critics call her opportunistic; admirers call her pragmatic. Either way, Meloni has mastered political shape-shifting, becoming a bridge between nationalist and mainstream Europe.
What unites Merz and Meloni is less ideology than necessity.
Germany remains Europe’s economic engine but needs partners to push Europe toward greater defense capacity and economic competitiveness. Italy is seeking greater influence and credibility at Europe’s core.
Both governments now speak the language of strategic autonomy: Europe must be able to defend itself and protect its interests even if the U.S. becomes unreliable. As the joint-paper reportedly being presented to other EU partners puts it: “Continuing on the current path is not an option. Europe must act now.”
Europe unites against a frenemy
Ironically, Europe’s unity has often emerged in response to crisis.
Brexit strengthened pro-EU sentiment on the mainland. Similarly, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine revived NATO and EU cooperation.
Now, Trump – with his flirtation with abandoning NATO commitments, threatening tariffs and questioning of territorial arrangements in places like Greenland – has delivered a shock to European political consciousness.
Recent surveys show overwhelming European support for stronger EU defense cooperation and greater unity against global threats.
For leaders like Merz and Meloni, this creates political space for policies that would have seemed unthinkable, or certainly more difficult, a decade ago, such as military buildups, defense integration, industrial protection and tougher migration policies.
Defense and militarization
The most dramatic change is, arguably, happening in Germany. For decades, Berlin avoided military leadership, haunted by its history and sheltered under U.S. security guarantees. That era is ending. German officials increasingly speak about rearmament, European defense readiness and long-term strategic competition.
The timing could not be more urgent. Merz, framing Moscow’s ongoing aggression as a direct assault on European security and unity, stated in September 2025 that “we are not at war, but we are no longer at peace either.”
The new German-Italian action plan explicitly strengthens cooperation on defense, cybersecurity and strategic industries. Both governments stress NATO loyalty while simultaneously pushing for stronger European military capacity.
The idea of a future European defense force, once dismissed as fantasy, now circulates seriously in policy circles. Rome is reportedly planning a major procurement deal with German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall worth up to US$24 billion (20 billion euros). Including hundreds of armored vehicles and new-generation tanks, it would represent one of Europe’s largest joint defense projects.
The move reflects a shared push by Berlin and Rome to strengthen Europe’s military capacity while anchoring rearmament in European industrial partnerships.
What’s in it for Meloni and Merz?
For Meloni, partnership with Berlin delivers legitimacy. Italy has traditionally oscillated between European leadership and peripheral frustration. By aligning with Germany, Rome reenters Europe’s decision-making core.
At the same time, Meloni can present herself as both nationalist at home and indispensable to Europe. Her political positions allow her to maintain channels with Washington while remaining inside EU consensus – a balancing act few European leaders can manage.
Germany, meanwhile, gains political flexibility and a partner more aligned with big-picture EU politics.
Macron’s ambitious federalist vision has at times alienated more cautious partners in the bloc. Italy offers a pragmatic counterweight for Merz, focused on competitiveness, migration control and industrial policy rather than a grand European redesign.
Macron isn’t being entirely squeezed out. France still leads on nuclear deterrence and many diplomatic initiatives. Yet political momentum is shifting and now lies with governments willing to prioritize economic competitiveness and security over institutional reform.
Will it work?
The Merzoni partnership faces major tests.
Italy’s economy remains fragile, and Germany’s export model struggles amid global economic shifts. Far-right and populist movements still challenge EU cohesion. And defense integration remains politically sensitive across member nations.
Yet necessity often drives European integration. And as crises accumulate, cooperation becomes less optional.
The real question is whether Europe can move from reactive crisis management to having a proactive geopolitical strategy. For now, the unlikely German-Italian partnership suggests Europe’s political map is being redrawn – not through grand federal visions but through pragmatic alliances shaped by fear, necessity and opportunity.
Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
