Emeritus

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Impact 20-Emeritus

Ivy League–caliber universities and graduate programs are known for being both highly selective and very costly, which means that for many students, continuing and executive education may offer the best shot at access to their resources and expertise. Since 2015, online education company Emeritus has striven to break down barriers between students and those schools. It partners with over 50 high-ranked institutions, including Harvard Medical School and MIT Sloan School of Management, to offer online certificates, courses, and degrees—through programs that in some cases are paid for by students’ employers.<br />
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Emeritus has served more than 200,000 learners since its launch, and this year alone it will reach 250,000 users across over 80 countries—part of a broader ambition to upskill and reskill the global workforce. The business has a current valuation of $3.2 billion and says it is set to realize over $500 million in bookings in 2022. It raised $650 million in Series E funding in August, in a round led by Accel and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 that included returning investors such as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative and Leeds Illuminate.

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Dr. Richard Haass, President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations (appearing virtually) Jacob Helberg, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission; Author, The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power (appearing virtually) Christopher Marquis, Sinyi Professor of Chinese Management, Judge Business School University of Cambridge Moderator: Polina Pompliano, Fortune

CEO Initiative 2023: Business With China

Conferences

Dr. Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations, Jacob Helberg, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission; Christopher Marquis, Judge Business School University of Cambridge, Polina Pompliano, Fortune

Dr. Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations, Jacob Helberg, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Christopher Marquis, Judge Business School University of Cambridge

The world's second largest economy is in the midst of a set of an unprecedented set of challenges after decades of GDP growth above 9% a year. China's economy is faltering due to factors that include a real estate crisis, deflation, declining consumer confidence, an aging population and the knock on effects of zero COVID policy add to that corporations pulling out of China due to concerns about new anti spying laws and rising geopolitical tensions. Like we heard earlier today, economists have long predicted that China will surpass the United States and become the world's leading economy. So is that assessment still a possibility or we troubles drag down the rest of the world and how should business leaders approach engagement with China right now? We're fortunate to have with us, a group of folks with decades of insights and experiences regarding China. This is going to be a fascinating panel. Richard Haass is President Emeritus of the independent nonpartisan membership organization, the Council on Foreign Relations. He's a veteran diplomat and a former White House Pentagon and State Department official, Jacob Helberg is a commissioner in the US China Economic and Security Review Commission which offers recommendations to Congress on the national security implications of the trade and economic relationship between the US. And China Jacob is also venture capital tech investor, author and former senior policy advisor at Google Chris Marquis is the senior Professor of Chinese Management at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School. He's an expert voice on entrepreneurship and market development in China. Ok. Quite the lineup. Please welcome them to the stage. Hi, everyone. So Richard, why don't we start with you? Can you give us an overview of the current state of China's economy and its post pandemic recovery and how it compares to the pre pandemic era? Sure, glad to there was a post pandemic sugar high like all sugar highs. That's, that's faded China. Now the economy is facing serious headwinds. You mentioned quite a few of them. What I would emphasize though, in addition to the specifics uh that, that you and others have pointed out is something that the Chinese leadership has emphasized political control much more than economic growth. In some ways, the headwinds are as much the the result of their own policies and their own priorities as anything else China would like the benefits of a free market economy without having one. It's a neat trick if you can pull it off in many ways, obviously, uh they can't. And the question is, what do they do going forward? Do they continue with the sort of economic policies they have now which they're paying a growth price for? Do they introduce greater reform that they've been reluctant to introduce? Do they possibly look to non economic policies to provide legitimacy and public support for the leadership and in particular a greater turn to nationalism? Those are the sorts of questions that China experts are debating and Richard follow up question for you. Um You said something really interesting in a podcast, you said I'm hard pressed to say there's any real difference between the Trump and Biden administration's policies on China. Why do you think that the different administrations have taken a similar approach in their relationship to China? Uh The reason is quite simple for several decades, the United States tried to engage China and really integrate China into the world, letting them into the World Trade Organization, for example, 22 decades ago and the goal was not simply access to this large and growing market, but there was a widespread view that engaging China integrating China economically would lead to a more open China politically, a more market oriented China economically and a more moderate China in terms of its foreign policy. What's happened over the last two decades in particular is that none of these hopes, none of these thoughts have been borne out. So what you see is a, is a bipartisan reaction, a kind of disillusionment with China. It's been exacerbated by the theft of intellectual property, the militarization of the South China Sea growing uh growing provocations if you will against uh Taiwan. So for it's a long list of things. So the Trump administration introduced something of a tougher policy and the Biden administration has kept most of it on including the uh the tariffs. It's continued if you will, the quote unquote, pivot to this part of the world, greater political military emphasis with presidents. The big difference between the two administrations is how they're going about it. The Trump administration tended to be more narrowly economic. The Biden administration has brought about much closer collaboration with America's partners and allies in this part of the world. In particular, Japan, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea, Jacob, you've said repeatedly that there is sort of a tech war between the US and China brewing. Adding that I thought this was fascinating. You said China has a system of civil military fusion while we have a system of civil military confusion. What do you mean by that? Yeah, so um first of all, thanks for having me. Um I just wanna second something that Richard said before I dive into your question and add that 83% of the American public has unfavorable views of China at this point according to Pew research, which I think is gonna cement, you know, a lot of bipartisan continuity across administrations including in Congress on in terms of having a very robust muscular foreign policy towards China, probably for years to come. Um On your question about civil military fusion. China has a system with a web of different national laws like the National Intelligence law and the raft of different laws that they passed just in the last year around the protection of domestic data, preventing foreigners from being able to conduct basic due diligence and so forth where they can basically command private companies to pursue political objectives, which is a very strong deviation from our basic conception of what a private company is in the US, in the US. Our conception of a private company is that their primary motive is a profit motive, a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders in China. You have this very exotic system where companies can actually be used as instruments of the state and actually pursue political objectives. And the Chinese system can effectively blur the line and erase the line between the public and the private in the US because of our separation. If there is a a deep problematic disconnect between the private sector and the public sector on a lot of really big national security questions, particularly the tech sector. Um historically Silicon Valley has skewed very ideal, you know, um uh ideologically, you know, idealistic. Um it has long seen a world that is quite borderless, you know, as a reflection of the open free flow of information online. And in the last five or so years, it's awaken to a world that is actually gripped with real geopolitical realities and renewed geopolitical great power competition. I think Ukraine was a deep wake up call to a lot of people in Silicon Valley that actually the world is rife with real adversaries that don't share American values. And that fundamentally want to restructure the international system in profound ways that are actually antithetical to uh basic principles that American companies including tech companies rely on like the open free flow of information. So it's been a long road to getting the tech sector to collaborate with the US government. Um I have been quite involved in a forum called the Hill and Valley Forum to try to bring those two communities together to try to resolve what I described as civil military confusion. Um But you know, there's still a lot of work to do and, and what do you think is the outcome of this tech war? Well, right now, we're really seeing a two track race, particularly um in artificial intelligence, we're seeing a race for supply chain independence that's taking place. So obviously, on the US side, you know, there's a whole suite of different expert control rules. Um There is our new partnerships as Richard mentioned being formed with Japan, South Korea. You know, back in January, there is uh there is a collaborative effort with the Netherlands to try to uh broaden and internationalized export control rules to countries that are home to companies like a SNL in the Netherlands to export um to ban exports of uh high end semiconductor machinery to China. Um but China took a lot of people by surprise when it recently produced a seven nanometer chip semiconductor chip, which is actually far more advanced than what a lot of people you know, expected China to be able to produce. So the takeaway is both sides are racing to try to become semiconductor independent in some way. Um And in the US, our definition of semiconductor independence is not reliant on China. Um So the US government has encouraged companies like Apple to reso to places like India and Vietnam. But the chip act in the US was a really big push, you know, on, on our side for semiconductor in independent. And then the other track is really a race for A G I, it's the software side of the race. So both countries are racing towards A G I uh which a lot of people view as potentially one of the most disruptive technologies in 80 years in the realm of specialized A I. Um there is a big push being done in military A I, you know, and the, what the Chinese refer to as intelligent warfare. Um And so you're seeing, you know, uh these different efforts uh advance on all fronts and it's ultimately culminating to um a pretty, you know, a pretty different world uh in which warfare is gonna look very different. Yeah, if anybody has a question, please raise your hand, we'll get a mic too. Um, and I, I'll come back to you in a minute. But um Chris, I wanna ask you, is us businesses kind of explore ways to partner with China. What are the primary opportunities and potential risks that you see in this environment? Yeah, I don't, I don't see a lot of opportunities. I mean, it's a lot of risks. I think for many of the reasons that Richard and Ryan just mentioned, I mean, there's a situation where over these last number of years, the extent to which party control has taken emphasis over, you know, economic development is, I mean, it's just gone through the roof and it has situations where you know, the party is really putting the screws to private businesses. You know, these are Chinese private businesses as Ryan talked about, which are really, you know, very closely connected to the to the state and the party. But then also you have situations where a lot of the due diligence companies, information is being limited. Just recently, there was a one of the executives of Kroll had an exit ban was not able to leave China. There's, you know, a lot of instances of people being disappeared in the business sector. So I think it's a very risky and challenging situation and a lot of uncertainty, you know Xi Jinping and other leaders talk about, you know, China is open for business, but all the actions they take suggest that it's actually a very, very closed environment and clearly they'd love to have foreign direct investment, but actually what they're doing is significantly discouraging it. Do you have any questions? Yes. Right here. I guess I just make a comment from the, um, we've been in China since 1997 and we advise companies. Um, and we're getting increasingly, um, not only the clients who are Western are leaving. I don't mean the companies are leaving. I mean, if they're staying, they're putting local talent in place because of the fear of some of the things that we're hearing about. And I don't know if any of the, any of you want to comment on this idea that um you know, that, that people are being much more closely monitored. If they say anything negative about the regime, if you collect information in the wrong way, you're all vulnerable and that does have a chilling effect and people are also looking on their, what their China plus one strategy is. But if you talk about it in China, you're in trouble. Anybody wanna react to that, Richard. I could say something. Yeah, let me say something that I think a lot of that is true and one is working in a, a more restrictive environment and it's gonna have consequences for, for some individuals or firms. We're seeing that I actually think though the bigger, more fundamental issue for businesses doing business and doing work in China is the technology issue. And even now, uh one is operating in a much more restrictive environment in terms of the ability of Western technology to reach China. And Secretary Yellen talks about the high fence and the small yard, well, the fence is pretty high and the yard is getting bigger. So at a minimum, anyone operating in China has to assume that it's a much more restrictive environment, particularly if there's any technology involved in their economic or business relationship with China. And then there's an added element of uncertainty and I'm not predicting it, but it can't be dismissed as if there ever were a major crisis between the United States and China say over Taiwan, then the economic sanctions and problems would transcend technology and they would essentially nothing would be immune from it. So I think what we now have and a minimum is technology related, uncertainty, almost a premium there. And a more general one given the uncertain trajectory of us Chinese relations, all this obviously has to be weighed against the size and importance of China's market. All of this has to be weighed against the importance of China as a supplier for a lot of companies. But it's become a much more complicated calculation for any firm. Yeah. And one more so Mark Newman with commerce company we're in, in the chemical manufacturing, a lot of chemical intermedia come out of China today. And uh so in the China plus one strategy, you just look to see where you could get those in India, but you know that their infrastructure in terms of these intermediates are so far behind. So it's really not a viable near term strategy. So I'm I'm curious as to, you know, can we continue this in a way that keeps access to certain Chinese intermediates, you know, sort of on the table, what will be the price of that access over time? And then maybe a sort of a derivative question, we see a lot of Chinese manufacturing going into Mexico. And so one of the questions I have over time is, you know, what's the relationship between the US and Mexico because of that over time, Chris do you want to tackle? Sure. So I mean, I think, you know, this has been written about a lot for apple, I mean, you know, where you know, so much of their supply chain for iphones is actually in China, they're trying to move it out. But places like India Vietnam, like you mentioned, just the infrastructure is not there. I mean, I think this is something where you know, the whole US economy is understanding of the systemic risks, the fact that we the dependence on China and over slowly over time, you know, there'll be increasing capacity in those other countries. And I think, you know, for this reason, even though I'm pretty pessimistic and negative on, you know, the Chinese Communist Party and how China is run, you know, being engaged and engaging is so important because of things like you're talking about. I think on the human level two, as I'm a professor in the education space, it's just been totally shut off a lot of the student exchanges. And if we're going to be able to continue to cooper over time, we need that human connection exchange. And so, you know, I would continue working with those partners but try to figure out, you know, over time, an alternative. Um Jacob and I point um you know, for years, I think a lot of people in the business community have discounted a lot of the warnings that folks in the national security have tried to flag about the authoritarian nature of the Chinese government. The fact that the direction of travel of Chinese policies were not going in the right direction, things are getting more authoritarian, things are getting more oppressive, they're asserting more of their control over every aspect of every individual's life. Now they're using technology like artificial intelligence to create this, you know, panopticon surveillance state that can actually try to predict people's behavior. I mean, I would, you know, a lot of people are also as Richard mentioned, uh warning about the risk of the real nonzero risk of a potential serious escalation in Taiwan Strait. So I would urge folks in the audience who are part of the business community to heed the warnings coming out of the national security space that China is an authoritarian country. And that's just the reality. And in an authoritarian country, you don't have due process and you can get arrested and your property can get uh expropriated and, you know, it's, that's just how it works. And so I would really think closely before uh increasing your exposure to China, especially in a context when the leader is, has gave more than four speeches, the space of two months telling his military to prepare for war. He's opening defense mobilization offices across this country. He's doing a lot of different things saying that you know, changes, he's setting changes afoot, the likes of which the world hasn't seen in 100 years. He is exhibiting a pattern that is deeply troubling and that is uh bringing a lot of meat to the argument that he is potentially preparing for an armed conflict. And that should be really concerning to people that have exposure to the Chinese market. On that terrifying note. Thank you for all our panelists for joining us today.

Lawrence H. Summers, Former U.S. Treasury Secretary (1999-2001); Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus, Harvard University(joining remotely)
In conversation with: Alan Murray, FORTUNE 


CEO Initiative 2022 - Inflation Risks For America And The Global Economy

Lawrence H. Summers, Former U.S. Treasury Secretary (1999-2001) President Emeritus, Harvard University
Alan Murray, FORTUNE 


Inflation Risks For America And The Global Economy


CEO Initiative 2022 - Inflation Risks For America And The Global Economy


So last year when economic officials and pundits and some of the administration officials seemed to overuse this word transitory. Our next guest was the person who really sounded the alarm about the risk of runaway inflation. And of course he was right when joe Manchin worried that the inflation reduction act would contribute more to inflation, uh, this guest talked to joe Manchin and basically convinced him it wouldn't, I think he was right about that as well. Larry Summers has been very clear and and almost alone in some cases in arguing that there is a difference between the inflationary effects of government spending that just feeds consumption and government spending that, uh, that can stimulate investment, like climb the climate provisions of the inflation reduction, childcare, uh, things like that. He's probably the one economic policy commentator who has has gotten it right for the last few years, which is why we've invited him here today to speak with all of you couldn't be here in person. So we're gonna bring him in virtually to have that conversation. Thanks Larry. I know you're there somewhere great. How are you Very well and it is good to be good to good to be with you, my friend. Even better to be here in person. We're with the warm weather. So we're sorry. We do. We we don't have you here, but thanks for taking the time. Professor has obligations to his uh classes that even exceed his obligations to his friends for 40 years like you. Well, well, thank you. Well, we'll we'll take this deal and thanks for thanks for being with us. Look, my big question for you. Larry is, is, I mean, we saw the Fed yesterday move another 75 basis points. We have brian Moynihan on the stage last night saying when he looks at the data, he doesn't see any slowdown. And so so my big question for you is, What is it gonna take, how much to interest rates have to move? How much economic pain are we going to have to suffer in order to get inflation back down to 2%. Um, I alan agree with my friend brian that the economy is running fairly strong right now and stronger than I probably would have expected. I was struck by the number that came out on monday that the number of vacancies in the economy had popped back up suggesting that we were moving back to a labor short economy. There's nothing that I've ever seen in economic experience that suggests that inflation comes way down and we've now got inflation at seven. So it has to come pretty far down without there being some meaningful amount of restrictive policy. And then that restrictive policy also restricts growth and employment, uh, in the economy. So I yanked after a long period when the Fed was really not in the right place at all and almost had its head in the sand. Um, believing in a transitory theory. Chairman Powell's navigating it into the direction into the right broad area. The markets now expecting that the federal funds rate just got increased core will get up somewhere in the 5, 10, 5 and a quarter range by next april my guess would be that the inflation pressures are still going to be a little greater than people supposed from the labor shortage. And so my guess would be that interest rates will end up that funds rates will end up above that. I would not be amazed if they got to sex, but that's certainly not what I would be uh predicting. I think it's very hard to know what's going to happen to inflation and unemployment. Um my instinct is that in some ways it's easier to forecast the two of them together than to forecast one of them alone. If we are actually on a path that brings inflation back close to the 2% target, I think we're likely to have seen a meaningful increase in unemployment. Um But whether we will actually push the process as hard in terms of disinflation, I'm less certain. Yeah, norman Powell certainly been very, very clear about his intent, but he hasn't really been clear about his intent at the same time, that he's been recognizing the price of his intent In terms of higher unemployment. It's a little bit like if I said I was going to buy an apartment in New York, you'd believe me. But if I said I was only gonna pay $500,000 for it, then you'd wonder whether I was really going to uh do it. That's a bit how I feel about the Fed's forecasts that unemployment will never go above 4.5% and and you know we've we've uh you and I at least are old enough to have seen this movie before, are we better off as an economy to uh to take the hit now or uh to spread it out over time? You know if you don't if if it's a mild recession and it doesn't get the uh get inflation down as much as he needs uh needs to be. Can can you do that slowly over time rather than in a in a big hit all at once. There's lots of metaphors, you can have a you can have a battle of metaphors talking about pulling band AIDS off and stuff like that. But I think the more serious way to think about it is that I think the best point that the people who are far more dovish than I like Paul Krugman um make is that unlike in the 1970s we have not yet seen a big increase in five or 10 year inflation expectations. So right now there's still a sense that we're in the range of price stability and that this has some temporary element in it and that puts a lot of wind at the back of anybody trying to reduce inflation. But if we let this continue for too long, we will lose that advantage. And that's why I think it is likely that the total cost of containing the inflation will be lower if we act more rapidly rather than if we act less rapidly. And I think it's important to remember that core inflation right now, you know, on the last figure was seven to the nearest round number and that was more than the month, was more than a quarter and a quarter was more than a half, a year and a half year was more than the year. So it certainly wasn't coming down fast and after yesterday we've got interest rates at four. So it's not like we're stepping on the brake with unprecedented force or anything like that, or anywhere close to stepping on the brake with unprecedented uh force. So for now, I think the the risk of doing too little is greater than the risk of doing too late. And I think one other point out, and maybe you'll disagree with me on this because you've been covering this stuff for 4.5 decades. Um I can think of a variety of moments when in retrospect the Federal Reserve or some other Central bank should have raised rates more and been more disciplined about inflation. Everybody worries that the Fed is going to move to move too quickly that they're going to forget the lags and then we're going to get an economic downturn and it's certainly something that has to be balanced. But I'm not aware of a historical moment when that ever happens. And in general, I think it's better to worry about negative scenarios that have occurred before than negative scenarios that have not occurred before. That doesn't mean there isn't a risk and that doesn't mean that the Fed doesn't have to strike a balance. But to put the point another way, is anyone really thinking that we're gonna have such a bad recession That it's gonna push inflation below the 2% target? And if we're are serious about the 2% target, then why would we think that policy had been to contractionary if inflation is not falling below the 2% target? Now there's a set of arguments, I I understand them. I think i it wouldn't be my arguments that we should not have a 2% target, we should have a higher target for inflation, But gosh, when you've made it made the kind of mistakes the Federal Reserve has made over the last year and a half of not taking inflation seriously and pounded away your commitment to a target. This doesn't seem like the moment to abandon that target. There is a line of thinking and you've already alluded to it, a line of thinking that because expectations are not dug in the way they were when paul Volcker uh took over the Federal Reserve, that it's gonna be easier to deal with, for instance, one of the things, some people, I think with some economists at Goldman Sachs who argued we don't actually have to raise the unemployment rate to combat inflation. We just have to bring down the unfilled jobs rate, eliminate some of that competition. Uh for jobs is it possible we can get out of this with uh with less pain than you seem to be suggesting. Here's a here's a piece of advice for all your viewers. Any any economist who says that something is impossible where they're sure that something will not happen is an economist whose opinions you should dismiss. So I answer all questions of the form. Is it possible by saying yes If you ask me. Um however uh is it likely. Um and you make that comparison with volker? I would make two points. The first is that Volcker's disinflation pushed the unemployment rate to 10.8% and nobody not the fiercest talk anywhere on the planet thinks we should elevate unemployment Halfway to 10.8% from where we are. Now. The second is this seductive idea and I think it is seductive that we can just get rid of the vacancies and not have any increase in our employment. Here's the fact right now the excess of vacancies over their normal level is about twice as large as it normally is in periods of strong economic performance. So the number of vacancies we might have to eliminate is kind of two x. There have been nine previous instances since World War Two when vacancies came down significantly. In every one of them unemployment went up substantially. So maybe it will turn out that this one is different. And you can argue that their special features of the post covid economy, you can argue that precisely because vacancies are so high this time is different. But in general if you have to bet with nine previous experiences or bet with no previous experiences and optimism, I think the better bet is with nine previous uh experience experiences. But again, anything is possible, frankly. The argument you're making looked better to a lot of people including me four days, five days ago before they got the most recent vacancies data because there had been a big decline in vacancies last month without any increase in unemployment. But now a quarter or a third of that of that decline got revised away and about half of that decline got reversed. And so you're seeing it, you're seeing it much less right now. But look, you don't leave a lot of room for argument. Larry anything is possible. You don't leave a lot of room for argument. I I'm gonna have a lot to a lot to talk to you about. But I also want if anyone in the in the group here has has a question just stick your hand up and we'll get a microphone to you. Uh Look you were according to the reports I read in large part responsible for convincing joe Manchin who's gonna be with us in just a few minutes, convincing joe Manchin to switch his position on the poorly named inflation reduction Act uh to uh to support it rather than oppose it. Um Can you share? And it's a really important argument I think for people thinking about the effects of of government spending, Can you share the argument you made? I don't know. I don't get into my private political conversations and I never take credit or blame for the political decisions than anyone. I've given advice to. Those are their decisions. What I will do, Alan is say what I thought about the inflation reduction act. In contrast to what happened before. There were three differences between the inflation reduction Act And the rescue act that took place at the beginning of 2021. 1st, the inflation reduction act was $600 billion 10 years, whereas the rescue act was plus the earlier stimulus was $2.8 trillion dollars over one year. So there was a total difference in scale. Second, the reduction Act was paid for fully by tax increases and other revenue increasing, so there was net no net change in the demand balance. And third, substantial parts of the reduction act were measures that would increase the economy's supply potential over over time, not simply pump up the level of demand. So factor of 10 difference in scale paid for versus not paid for expanded uh increased capacity versus just increased consumption spending? Those were the reasons why? I thought they were very different. It's that third, it's an inflationary impact. Yeah, it's that third one that's kind of unique. And you laid this out before this administration even came in that if you're investing, if its investment in uh the energy transformation or maybe also in something like child care or training, that has a fundamentally different effect on inflation. Do you feel like you've made progress with that argument? Making some progress? Look, it's it's the same basic logic for the government as it is if you're advising your kids, if your kids want to borrow money to go to go educate themselves or they want to buy borrow money to buy the house of their dreams they're gonna live in for 30 years. That's probably a very reasonable idea, particularly if interest rates are low and they're locking in a low rate if your kids want to borrow because they didn't earn as much money as they have liked to and they still want to eat out a lot and take a lot of vacations. That's probably much less sound borrowing. And some parallel principle applies with respect to uh the government. Yes. And I think I think that is becoming better understood. Um So, so uh Larry this, I know you are still in close contact with people in this administration, the administration is from time to time, uh, blamed inflation on corporate concentration or corporate profiteering. What do you think of those two arguments? I don't think that those are the administration's soundest economic pronouncements. Um, look, I think there are a number of areas where we should have stronger antitrust enforcement, but I don't think inflation has anything much to do with uh, gouging or monopoly power. And I think some of the doctrines that have been put forth by the so called neo Grand icings, um, are really very radical and very unfortunate and are the wrong places to go. Look, I think there are issues that democrats are right to have with business. Uh, there's some stuff with corporate tax shelters that have carried interest tax break, a variety of things that I think are kind of outrageous, but I think some of the regulatory kinds of agendas that treat profit as a bad thing, treat uh, business as a money pot, uh, failed partner. I don't think that's the right approach uh, for people to take in terms of uh, getting things, getting things done. I like approaches based wherever possible on partnership much better. And I think there's some real potential in uh, the green area in particular to do that. I think the chips act is gonna be a very important test of how well as a society we can do in having government business partnerships on some really important issues. I'm glad you raised the chips act because the last time you were on a Fortune stage conference stage Was in in the fall of 2018 in Toronto at the Fortune Global Forum. And I remember how you ended that conversation, you you said the most, the most consequential uh, thing to watch for economics and the world over the coming decade was the relationship between the us and Japan. Uh, that was five years ago. I'm sorry. I misspoke china china. Yeah, yeah, I misspoke apologies. I'm still waking up U. S. And china. It was china. My my totally misspoke uh, five years have passed. What and a lot has happened in the US china relationship over those five years. Uh, what do you see now, by the way, I think you're going to make a habit of remembering what I say at fortune. Oh yeah, throwing it back in my face five years later. I mean you get a lot more fortunate. Uh, But in this case, um, I'm Glad I said that because I think it was right. I would say relative to what I would have expected, then we're in about the 15th or 10th or 15th%ile of outcomes. I think on the, on the bad side, because I would say the relationship has massively deteriorated on both sides. I think primary responsibility for that uh, rests with uh, xi Jinping and a variety of excessively assertive, aggressive nationalist discriminatory totalitarian policies that china has followed. But I don't think the United States has yet in place a sound strategy beyond pointing up its legitimate indignation but warranted indignation does not constitute a strategy. And I am very concerned that the situation has more and more overtones of Britain and Germany As one moves from 1910, towards uh 1914. Some of it is uh, geopolitical and the difficulty in maintaining the peace through ambiguity approach that has been that has been successful in Taiwan for 50 years. Some of it has to do with the question of rules governing trade. The most undercovered story of the last three months and maybe of the last three years has been the extent to which the american uh government launched a kind of economic warfare on china with the semiconductor uh, restrictions that were announced several weeks ago. Now, I don't have access to the classified information that would permit me to judge whether those steps were uh, necessary uh or not. But I do think they're framing um, was very much one in terms of a kind of economic warfare and holding the china down rather than limiting access just to key military technology. And I think that has to strengthen the hawks uh, in china. And so I hope when President biden and Premier G meet in bali, it can be a basis for not getting this to affection, God knows, not getting this to partnership. Uh, God knows, but of stabilizing it because I think we are, we in china are like two guys each of whom holding or in a lifeboat, a small lifeboat in a turbulent sea, a long way from shore. We depend on each other. Um, even however we may feel about each other. There's no alternative to finding a way of functioning together. Uh, Larry, on that encouraging note. I will let you get back to your teaching, but, but thanks for taking some time to speak with this group. But we really thank you. Thank you for having me. Thank you for having me.

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