In early 2022, Russia and China famously declared their friendship had “no limits,” right before Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
More than three years later, that relationship is looking increasingly lopsided, and apparently doesn’t include friendly discounts, as Moscow relies heavily on Beijing to cushion the blow of Western sanctions.
A recent report from the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies found that the median price Russia paid for Chinese exports of sanctioned products soared 87% between 2021 and 2024. For exports from other countries, however, prices of sanctioned goods rose just 9% during that time.
Researchers highlighted ball bearings, which is on the European Union’s list of high-priority items. While the value of Chinese ball-bearing exports to Russia jumped by 76% from 2021 to 2024, the quantity of exports actually dropped by 13%, indicating that the unit price doubled.
And for tapered roller bearings, the unit price nearly quadrupled. Both types of products are critical industrial inputs that could also be used in Russia’s weapons sector.
“Our general results, illustrated here with two simple examples, lead us to conclude that trade sanctions have been successful in their aim of limiting Russia’s access to critical goods,” the Bank of Finland said.
To be sure, China wasn’t the only country that was able to squeeze higher prices from Russia. The report said Turkish export prices of sanctioned goods to Russia were up 25% to 55% compared with other exports.
Overall, prices of sanctioned products were 40% higher than prices of non-sanctioned products.
A separate note from Capital Economics said total bilateral trade between Russia and China fell 9% during the first nine months of 2025 compared with a year ago. That’s after trade more than doubled between 2020 and 2024.
China now accounts for 30% of Russia’s goods exports and 50% of its imports. On the flip side, Russia accounts for just 3% of China’s goods exports and 5% of its imports.
As Chinese firms fear potential fallout from Western sanctions on Moscow, there’s little sign that China is expanding supply chains in Russia, while foreign direct investment remains limited.
“Overall, the Russia-China relationship is—and will remain—asymmetric,” Capital Economics said. “China is more important for Russia economically than Russia is for China. And Russia wants and needs more from the relationship than China is willing to provide.”
The reports come amid signs that the Kremlin has proposed business deals with the U.S. as part of talks to end the Ukraine war and lift sanctions.
Meanwhile, Putin’s wartime economy is hitting a wall as production bottlenecks, labor shortages, tighter government spending, and the lack of Western technology are increasingly causing strains.
“To produce substantially more equipment or recruit and train far more soldiers, Moscow would have to shift to a more comprehensive war footing by directing all available resources toward military needs, as it did during World War II, or commandeering civilian production lines for military purposes,” Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and former Russian central bank advisor, wrote in Foreign Affairs last month.
