Over those years, I have watched extraordinary founders build remarkable organizations, and I have also watched some stay too long. Few decisions reveal more about a leader’s judgement than knowing when their continued presence strengthens an institution, and when it begins to weaken it. That same pattern appears far beyond business. 

There is a particular kind of failure that history reserves for some of its most admired figures: the failure of people devoted to a cause who, by refusing to step away at the right moment, hand that cause to its enemies. The reasons vary—ego, misjudgment, or the counsel of those invested in proximity to power—but the outcome is consistent: supporters are left with a sense of betrayal when the failure to step aside enables the very outcome they sought to prevent.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg spent her life building a jurisprudence of equality. By 2013–2014, after surviving serious illness, she had a clear opportunity to secure a successor aligned with her values. She declined, confident her health would hold and that the presidency would remain in sympathetic hands. She was wrong about who would name her successor. Trump’s Amy Coney Barrett, who replaced her, helped form the majority that overturned Roe, the decision most central to the legacy Ginsburg sought to protect. Just as important, that appointment contributed to a Court that has expanded the formal powers and protections of the presidency. The consequence is not confined to any single ruling: we now have a presidency willing to test limits and norms, reinforced by a Court that has enlarged its authority. It is the interaction of those forces, not any one decision, that gives the current moment its particular danger.

Ginsburg’s decision was a wager under uncertainty. She bet that she would live for years, remain productive, and that the political environment would cooperate. She was right about the first two and wrong about the third. Such miscalculation is human. She made a political judgment, whether or not she described it that way. She chose to stay, and the bet failed.

Having defeated Donald Trump once, Joe Biden spent four years insisting he was uniquely positioned to do so again. Having described himself as a bridge to the next generation, he might have committed early to a single term and allowed time for a genuine process to produce a successor. He did the opposite. By the time his candidacy collapsed, the time required to mount an effective alternative had largely disappeared. In withdrawing late, he effectively narrowed his party’s options at the moment they mattered most.

Ginsburg misjudged an unknowable future; Biden failed to respond to a visible present. One error was a forecast that proved wrong; the other was a refusal to act on evidence already in view. The latter is harder to defend. Nor was Biden’s failure his alone. Those closest to him had the clearest view of his condition and the greatest influence over what was shown to the country. In protecting the individual, they compromised the cause they believed he alone could serve.

What unites these cases is the indispensability delusion: the belief that the cause requires the individual, and that departure would amount to abandonment. The leader does not say, “I want to stay,” but rather “the institution cannot do without me.” This is the most dangerous form of the error, because it does not announce itself as ambition. Naked hunger for power is visible, and we know to distrust it; the indispensability delusion wears the costume of duty, telling the leader that the discipline of leaving is actually a dereliction, and that one more term, or one more year on the bench, is a sacrifice made for others rather than a comfort taken for oneself.

History is dense with this pattern, and the better cases show the same supporting cast. Woodrow Wilson, having suffered a debilitating stroke in 1919, refused to yield the presidency while his wife and physician quietly hid his condition from the country, deciding on his behalf what the nation would be permitted to know. This helped doom American entry into the League of Nations, the project Wilson had staked his name upon. A similar claim could be made about Churchill’s return to power in 1951, when a stroke two years later was likewise hidden. The principal’s delusion is the visible part. It almost always also rests on a circle of those closest to the leader who are willing to sustain it.

There is a simple test. A leader truly serving a cause larger than themselves should be able to name the conditions under which they would leave, and, crucially, should arrange their departure early enough that the cause has time to produce a worthy successor. In many positions of leadership, leaving is not a single act at the end. It is a process that must be started while there is still runway, because a successor does not appear on demand; an institution sometimes needs years to surface and test one. The leader who waits until the last moment, then announces that no acceptable replacement exists, has usually engineered that very outcome by waiting. The figure who experiences every prompt to begin the process as a threat rather than a relief has confused the cause with the self.

I write this as someone who has heard that voice. I make no comparison between myself and a justice or a president, and the stakes I faced were not remotely theirs; but the phenomenon is not confined to the highest offices. It attaches to every form of leadership, which must eventually come to an end, and that is the only standing I claim. The voice insists that no one understands the enterprise the way you do, that you and the institution are the same object, that stepping aside is a form of abandonment. Recognizing it as a liar is not the same as overcoming it. The work lies in acting against it while the choice is still yours to make.

The discipline this requires is rare, but it is not hypothetical. As the country marks its 250th year, it is worth recalling that the republic exists in its present form partly because George Washington demonstrated that discipline twice. In 1783, having won the revolutionary war, he relinquished his power to Congress rather than use it to ensure his continuation. Then, in 1796, he declined a third presidential term, establishing the principle that the office must outlast the man. He understood that precedent, not tenure, was his most important contribution. His contemporaries called him the American Cincinnatus, after the Roman who laid down absolute power the moment the crisis that summoned it had passed. That the ideal was so ancient, and the examples so few, is precisely what makes the discipline remarkable.

Modern cases confirm the test rather than complicate it. Nelson Mandela served a single term and stepped down in 1999, on a continent where liberation leaders routinely became presidents for life. The restraint was itself the message: the movement, not the man. What distinguishes these figures is that they surrendered power voluntarily, while it was still theirs to keep, at moments when continuation would have been possible or even popular. They treated departure as fulfillment rather than loss.

For those who view recent institutional developments as deeply damaging, the sense of betrayal is acute. The damage was not done only by opponents. It was enabled by those most entrusted to prevent it, acting in the belief that the cause required continuity. We expect our opponents to seek our undoing; we do not expect to be undone by the very stewards who assured us, sincerely but mistakenly, that they were holding the line.

The lesson is not that leaders should distrust their own importance. Some genuinely are, for a time, the right person for the moment; Washington was, as were Lincoln in 1864, Roosevelt in 1932, and Churchill in 1940. Indispensability is sometimes real, which is exactly what makes the test so hard: the sense of being uniquely needed is itself the distortion, weighting the case for staying when the facts do not warrant it, so that self-interest arrives disguised as the cause’s own demand. The more indispensable you actually are, the more carefully you must plan your departure, and the more suspicious you should be of any voice—your own, or those of the circle around you—assuring you that the institution cannot survive your leaving. Washington heard that voice and overruled it. That, more than any battle, is why the office outlasted him.

There is a reason this discipline is so rare, and it is not only ego. Our culture has built a shrine to perseverance. We teach grit as an unmixed virtue and treat walking away as quitting. Annie Duke, in her book Quit, argues that this is a costly confusion: knowing when to fold is not the opposite of grit but its necessary partner, a decision skill most of us exercise too late rather than too early, because identity and the fear of looking inconsistent make leaving harder than the arithmetic warrants.

Entrepreneurs feel this acutely, because the thing they are asked to relinquish is something they often built from almost nothing. To hand it on while you can still picture running it better feels like a small death, and the culture offers a vocabulary for holding on but none for leaving well. Yet the founder who steps aside at the right moment, before decline forces the question, is not quitting. The test does not care about scale. It asks only whether you can tell the difference between what the cause needs and what you need, and whether you can act on the answer while the choice is still yours to make rather than mortality’s, or the electorate’s. To leave at the right moment is not weakness. It is the rarest form of strength, and the one we have been least willing to honor.

The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

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Many of the founders argued that the country needed a remodeled government. They asked whether it was possible to design a government for the new country that ensured liberty in the face of the inherent flaws of human nature.

Revolution’s aftermath

In the aftermath of the American Revolutionary War, the national government remained a loose confederation of state governments. While effective in winning the war, the new government faced social and political fissures in the postwar period.

The war left the new republic with extensive debts shared unevenly between the states. Common farmers, including many Revolutionary War veterans, rebelled in opposition to postwar taxation policies. Rather than a cohesive national unit, Americans faced a loose, tense and combative set of state and local interests.

The Second Continental Congress in 1777 produced the first constitution of the United States, the Articles of Confederation. However, differing interests between state governments, including the management of western territory and public finance, slowed ratification. Only in 1781, as the Revolutionary War was entering its final stage, did all of the states finally agree to ratify the articles.

Both the terms of ratification and the text of the Articles of Confederation reflected a suspicion between the state governments, each of which wanted to protect their own local interests rather than cede authority to the national government.

Lumbering system

The limited powers that the articles granted to the national government reflected the lack of consensus between states. The government designed in the articles lacked any strong executive authority and did not have a national judiciary.

Additionally, the national legislature, which the articles referred to as a “league of friendship,” functioned less like a representative organ of the people at large than a council of state governments.

The articles created a single-chamber Congress in which each state cast one vote. Major legislation required a supermajority, and amendments required unanimity.

To many, such a slow-moving, restrictive system was preferable, particularly with the memory of the abuses of the British government still in recent memory.

However, the 1780s saw a series of contentious events – a barely thwarted uprising of frustrated soldiers called the Newburgh Conspiracy, interstate trade disputes, an economic depression and a rural tax rebellion that prompted many American leaders to reconceptualize the role and structure of American government around a more unified, national and interventionist model.

Competing visions

The nationalists were members of the Constitutional Convention that met in Philadelphia in the Summer of 1787 to draft the successor to the articles, the United States Constitution. This group included Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. These three men sought to convey that the proper role of government is to protect people from themselves.

The nationalists believed in a more centralized national union that balanced competing interests in the new republic. They sought to eliminate friction between the states by eliminating interstate trade barriers, consolidating state debts and creating a stronger central administrative body under a strong executive.

Furthermore, they sought to create a balance of power by creating a three-part federal government consisting of a two-chamber legislature, an executive branch and a national judiciary. Each would have expanded powers.

In contrast to the articles, the proposed Constitution included uniform national commercial regulation, monetary controls such as the exclusive right of the national government to issue legal tender, augmented executive powers to determine foreign policy and an overarching federal court structure. It also included an explicit national power to suppress uprisings.

The representatives to the convention, which also included prominent figures such as George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, considered the federal government’s ability to deal with uprisings and fiscal policy to be particularly important. It was also topical: A tax imposed on cash-poor farmers to pay down the public war debt had just prompted a rebellion in western Massachusetts led by Revolutionary veteran Daniel Shays.

Many rebels believed the burden of repaying the public debt fell disproportionately on common people while benefiting elites. Nationalist political theorists such as Hamilton, Madison and Jay saw such revolts against national authority as the product of demagogues instigating unrestrained urges into social movements they referred to as “factions.”

Initially, the terms of the new Constitution received substantial opposition from prominent political writers later known as the Anti-Federalists. These often anonymous authors began publishing criticisms of the yet unratified Constitution as an unwarranted accumulation of federal power that would endanger the hard-won liberties secured by the Revolutionary War.

This is where the document that has become known as the Federalist Papers comes in.

‘If men were angels …’

Hamilton, Madison and Jay responded to these criticisms as a group. Adopting the pen name Publius, they published 85 essays in New York newspapers supporting ratification. In defense of the Constitution’s proposal to increase the powers of the proposed national government, these authors turned to some of the most basic philosophical questions about humanity.

Each argued that the inherent flaws of human nature necessitated a strong government to check political abuse, self-interest and even violence that they saw as inherent in the fabric of human society. They rallied around the position reflected in Madison’s famous statement in the essay known as Federalist 51 that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary.”

The Federalist Papers include proposals for institutional solutions that sought to redirect the destructive drives of individuals toward positive social ends. To the authors, a new constitutional government that controlled both the impulses of the masses and the abuses of their leaders would serve as the means through which the new United States government could accomplish this task.

Each saw human nature as susceptible to corruption by base impulses and self-interest.

In Federalist 10, Madison argued that faction is “sown in the nature of man.”

Similarly, in Federalist 6, Hamilton rejected the commonly held idea that republics were automatically peaceful. Instead, he argued, political leaders and states were driven by ambitions and jealousies, which he saw as a characteristic shortcoming of the government under the Articles of Confederation as well as a law of nature governing relations between nations.

Hamilton wrote that if the states remained disunited, then “the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other.” To argue otherwise, he wrote, would be “to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”

Consequently, as Hamilton asserted in Federalist 15, governments must have effective coercive authority to enforce laws because they cannot rely solely on the goodwill and civic virtue of their citizens: “If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.”

Ultimately, the defense of the Constitution provided by the Federalist Papers sought to frame the new government in terms of a skeptical view of humanity that recognized what Madison called “a degree of depravity in mankind.”

They also asserted that constitutional design and balanced government could control these dangerous impulses. As Madison added, “There are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.”

Donovan Fifield, Instructor, Department of History, University of South Carolina

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While President Donald Trump has promoted AI advancement, calling it crucial to economic and national security, polling shows that 7 in 10 Americans oppose the construction of AI data centers in their communities, citing higher utility bills, pollution, noise and the loss of green space. These centers, which hold computer servers that process words, images and lines of code for large language models such as ChatGPT, also use high amounts of water and electricity.

There is growing opposition to the infrastructure surrounding them, too, particularly the transmission lines needed to power them, which often must cross land belonging to private citizens.

Where private citizens refuse to sell their land, companies are turning to eminent domain, the government’s inherent power to seize private property without a landowner’s consent. But does a line built to serve a private data center qualify?

I’m a legal scholar who studies eminent domain issues, and I interpret today’s disputes over seizure of property for the benefit of AI infrastructure as the latest incarnation of a long-standing debate about the limits of taking private property for public use.

Why is expansion needed?

Data centers have massive power needs that can stress electrical grids and threaten their reliability. In 2024 they accounted for more than 4% of the nation’s total electricity use. Demand will grow as more are built. To meet this demand, power companies must build more transmission lines – and acquire land to put them on.

Across the U.S. – in states such as Georgia and Pennsylvania – power companies have looked to eminent domain to facilitate these goals.

What is eminent domain?

Power companies can approach landowners to purchase easements for transmission lines; if landowners refuse, the government might force a sale.

The government may take private land without consent if the seizure is for “public use” and if the landowner is given “just compensation,” according to the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

While the federal government has the power to initiate eminent domain actions – also called condemnations – most are done by state and local governments.

Governments can also delegate this power to private entities or “common carriers,” such as power and water companies, though every state has its own rules for whether and how these utilities can exercise eminent domain. In Texas, for example, the state Supreme Court has held that a project must “serve the public” and “cannot be built only for the builder’s exclusive use” in order to qualify as a common carrier.

What is the ‘public use’ standard?

While property may be taken only for “public use,” the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted that requirement permissively. In its 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision, the court held that economic development qualified, allowing New London, Connecticut, to seize homes for private development around a Pfizer facility. That redevelopment, however, never happened, and Pfizer eventually left New London.

In response to that decision – and the public backlash that followed – 45 states enacted eminent domain reform laws.

In addition to reform laws, some state supreme courts interpret the eminent domain provisions of their own state constitutions more restrictively. The supreme courts of Michigan, Ohio and Oklahoma have all prohibited seizing private property to give it to another private party purely for economic development.

This means private landowners may have more success challenging condemnation actions under their state constitutions than in federal court. Still, courts typically permit exercise of eminent domain by utilities such as power companies.

What does this mean for data center expansion?

Suits challenging the seizure of property for transmission lines on the grounds of public use have mixed results.

For example, the supreme courts of South Dakota and Vermont have each affirmed seizures by power companies, determining that providing at least some energy and improved power grid reliability to in-state customers were valid public uses.

But this argument changes if transmission lines, some of which cross state lines, don’t benefit anyone in the state.

In 1984, for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected a power company’s condemnation action because the transmission line in question would have run from Mississippi into Louisiana without benefiting any Mississippi customers.

These decisions suggest that as data centers increase energy demand and stress current infrastructure, seizing land to improve power grid reliability will likely qualify as public use, especially if the intention is to secure reliability for in-state customers.

Still, arguments around whether additional transmission lines actually serve in-state customers may give landowners grounds for a challenge.

Aaron Walayat, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton

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BMW filed a patent with the German Patent and Trade Mark Office in 2024 for a new screw design that includes the shape of its logo. It would require BMW-specific tools to remove it, effectively locking out independent auto shops that have not bought them.

“The invention is based on the objective of providing a screw which has a specific drive structure which cannot be tightened and/or unscrewed, or can only be tightened with a small number of standard screwdriving tools.” the patent states. “The shape of the engagement recesses prevents the screw from being loosened or tightened using common counter-drive structures by unauthorized persons.”

While BMW has not yet implemented its screw patent into its production, lawmakers are pushing back against automakers attempting to control who can interact with their vehicles.

Bills like the Repair Act, which was introduced in 2023 and reintroduced in 2025, would require manufacturers to provide vehicle owners and independent repair facilities with the same diagnostic repair information and tools that are already available to franchised dealerships. It would also direct the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the law against manufacturers that fail to comply.

Automotive content creator ChrisFix is one of the leading voices in championing the Repair Act online. As a car enthusiast who built a following repairing vehicles on his YouTube channel with over 11 million subscribers, he believes consumers deserve the right to choose where to get their vehicle serviced.

“On a fundamental level, I think most people would agree it’s good to have options,” he said. “If the OEMs become a monopoly, prices are going to increase substantially and that’s not good for the consumer.”

However, much of the advocacy has been focused on mechanical parts and hardware; leaving automotive advocates concerned about a car’s software.

Automakers currently can block access to repair data in their manufactured vehicles, according to repairact.com, forcing consumers to rely solely on dealership repair shops. The Repair Act would require these automakers to open access to vehicle-generated repair and maintenance data, repair tools, and even software.

“We’ve always been able to adjust, but now what we’re beginning to find is that the data that we need to be able to repair those vehicles is not being made available through conventional means,” Bill Hanvey, CEO and president of the Auto Care Association, said. “Now, with many of these EVs, all of that repair and maintenance data is transmitted systematically back to the car manufacturer, and it’s not being made available to the consumer.”

According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, many automakers attempt to limit the amount of software that is available to outside entities due to market competition. It also noted that price hikes for auto maintenance and repair have been running ahead of inflation for parts, new cars and used cars.

“The increases may reflect the power of suppliers in a concentrated market to raise prices above a competitive rate,” the report said.

Courtesy of Congressional Research Service

EV manufacturers may also be more wary of allowing their technology to be open-source due to higher competition and cybersecurity concerns.

Louay Abdelkader, director of product management at QNX, also emphasized the importance of cybersecurity in AI-driven vehicles and highlighted the need for weighing access to vehicle systems against data protection needs.

“There has to be a fine balance between giving the consumers the ability to do certain things with a car and at the same time also ensure the integrity of not just the data, but the car itself,” he said.

But Hanvey said EV manufacturers can effectively price gouge their consumers, claiming that an aftermarket repair can be completed at up to 36% less than at a dealership shop.

According to a study commissioned by the Auto Care Association, 51% of independent repair shops reported sending up to five vehicles per month to a dealer due to vehicle data restrictions. 

This can leave consumers stranded if their main source of vehicle service goes out of business. 

The collapse of EV maker Fisker in 2024, however, provides an example of how to avoid that. 

The California-based company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2024, less than a year after beginning deliveries of its flagship SUV, the Fisker Ocean.

Leading up to Fisker going belly-up, Cristian Fleming and other Fisker owners founded the Fisker Owners Association, an organization bent on continuing to give Fisker vehicles life. Soon after the Fisker bankruptcy filing, they organized and utilized independent experts to reverse-engineer Fisker software.

“In the month or so before the bankruptcy, because all of us saw it coming, people were just freaking out,” Fleming said, now CEO of the FOA. “It was born out of necessity, and the decision that we had to do something.”

The FOA also negotiated access to Fisker operating systems during the bankruptcy proceedings, coordinated parts sourcing, and developed maintenance guides to ensure the Fisker Oceans can continue operating.

Fisker owners gained access to critical components, tutorials and maintenance guides, as well as new feature updates to their vehicles through FOA. According to the organization’s website, there are 19 service shops that can service Fisker vehicles located in the United States. 

Fleming predicted the future of vehicle autonomy will mirror Fisker’s situation. He hopes that vehicle ownership also includes vehicle autonomy for car owners in the future.

“I want to actually harness FOA to really explore that challenge and make it a more public thing that people are talking about,” he said. “People who own these vehicles should have some say in the vehicles they own.”

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

Recent headlines have focused in particular on soaring tomato prices. They spiked by roughly one-fifth from June 2025 to June 2026, according to consumer price data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

But across the board, fruits and vegetables have gotten more expensive. Lettuce prices jumped by about 32% during that same 12-month period, while prices for all fresh vegetables increased about 10%. Fresh fruit saw smaller hikes, with apples up 7% and citrus fruit prices rising 6%..

As an agricultural economist, I see a complex mix of factors at work: extreme weather, worker shortages and rising labor costs, and high energy and shipping prices, as well as fallout from the Trump administration’s trade policies, just to name a few. And because some of these inflation drivers affect multiple sectors, costs are building up throughout the supply chain.

The breadth of these factors suggests that widespread relief may not come quickly. But inflation-weary shoppers can still take some steps to ease the sting of high prices.

What’s driving higher fruit and vegetable prices?

To start with, weather disruptions have cut supply and pushed prices up.

Unusual freezes in Florida in early 2026, for example, hit a variety of crops – including citrus, strawberries, blueberries, tomatoes and sweet corn – leading to yield losses and higher prices.

Imports also play a critical role in the U.S. food supply, especially during the winter and early spring months, when domestic production is limited. And if adverse weather conditions coincide with changes in trade policy, as is the case with the U.S.-Mexico relationship, produce supply and prices are especially affected.

The surge in tomato prices is a good example.

To protect the domestic tomato industry, the U.S. Commerce Department withdrew in June 2025 from a deal with Mexico, known formally as the U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement, to end duty-free access for Mexican tomatoes. This move effectively imposed a 17% antidumping duty on most tomato imports.

With imports accounting for about three-quarters of the U.S. tomato supply and Mexico supplying the overwhelming majority of foreign-grown tomatoes, U.S. consumers ultimately picked up the tab. In addition, reports suggest that Mexican tomato production declined after the agreement ended, with tomato imports dropping by 13% year over year. That diminished supply likely pushed prices higher.

Rising costs across the produce supply chain

Growing everything from strawberries to collard greens is labor intensive, and for many years, worker shortages have compelled farms to hike wages. Amid those pressures, producers are reporting that having to pay more for labor is adding to their own rising production costs.

Another factor is fertilizer prices, which have spiked due to disruptions caused by the Iran war. This geopolitical shock has affected the flow of goods, including fertilizer and oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, hiking prices and fueling volatility in global fertilizer markets.

Fertilizer prices paid to manufacturers jumped by more than 20% year over year in June 2026, while nitrogen fertilizer prices increased a whopping 46%, according to U.S. government data.

With all these factors driving up costs, farmers have little control over the prices they receive for their products. Market prices are largely determined by the forces of demand and supply, including domestic production and imports. And considering that producer costs account for only about one-third of the retail price for fresh produce, those increases aren’t always fully passed through to consumers.

Beyond production costs, higher fuel prices have made doing business throughout the supply chain more expensive. The Iran war has resulted in a significant spike in fuel prices – roughly 27% over the year – which trickles down through the economy.

This jump has a pronounced effect on refrigerated truck rates, which are critical for shipping fresh produce. Those were 20% higher in June 2026 compared with June 2025, according to data from the Department of Agriculture.

In effect, these increases raise both the cost of producing fresh produce and of getting it from the farm to the final consumer.

What can shoppers do?

Food inflation delivers a major hit on consumer budgets, particularly for low-income Americans, who are more sensitive to price increases. When the quality of diet in vulnerable households drops, rising food costs may be among the contributing reasons. A May 2026 survey of shoppers illustrates this financial squeeze, with 1 in 3 households reporting a drop in fresh produce purchases as a result.

But there are still workarounds if you’re seeking affordable yet healthy options. For example, certain types of produce and legumes have been less affected by inflation, including bananas, oranges, potatoes, dried beans, peas and lentils.

Shoppers should also look to canned and frozen fruit and vegetables to save money. They’re just as healthy but less affected by inflation because their longer shelf life means that factors such as weather and transportation play less of a role. Prices for processed produce increased year over year by just 3%, and 2.4% for frozen.

The substitution for cheaper alternatives is already evident in consumer choices, as 1 in 5 shoppers have reported shifting from fresh to frozen produce.

That said, sustained produce inflation makes healthy eating more difficult – which is why the search for affordable alternatives is increasingly important.

With so many factors contributing to higher inflation, some of the challenges affecting produce prices may be too long-lasting and hard to resolve overnight. As a result, relief at the checkout line may take longer than many consumers would like.

Elizabeth Canales, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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In fact, a “third wave of autocratization” has seen democracy pushed back to levels not seen since 1978, the authors of the 2026 V-Dem report conclude. Worse, many of the 92 autocracies around the world are becoming more repressive.

And all this is happening while the economy has globalized — something that many political economists thought would encourage democracy among previously undemocratic nations.

So what’s going on? We spoke to Arizona State University’s José Kaire, whose book, “The Road to Repression,” explores the link between economic liberalization and the slide into deeper authoritarianism.

Walk us through your theory

The book starts from a simple puzzle: Dictatorships today are as repressive as ever. This is surprising because 40 years ago, many believed that economic liberalization would push autocracies toward democratic politics.

The logic was straightforward: Take away the state’s economic power, and you limit its ability to repress. The theory was that economic liberalization did this by privatizing state-owned enterprises, deregulating markets and opening economies to trade and investment. As people became less dependent on the government for jobs, credit and economic opportunity, they would gain the autonomy to organize, oppose authoritarian rulers and demand greater political freedoms.

This idea, associated with Nobel laureates Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, remains influential among many scholars and even served as part of the founding mythos of the Washington Consensus, a policy agenda championed by international financial institutions and leading world powers. It helped make economic liberalization the default prescription for countries across the developing world.

But reality has been much messier. The book documents how countries like Mexico, Malaysia and Senegal saw human rights abuses increase after embracing liberalization. About half of all autocracies have experienced similar trajectories after opening their economies. Why did a policy meant to weaken authoritarian rule sometimes make it more violent instead?

My answer focuses on the role of autocratic political elites – that is, the party officials, military officers and other regime insiders who control the state. For them, liberalization not only brings economic change, but it also represents a fundamental political threat. It can empower regime outsiders, such as an emerging business class or opposition leaders, who may later force their way into the system, diluting the influence of the old guard.

Dictators who liberalize then risk alienating their ruling coalition. When elites are strong, dictators cannot afford to lose their support, as they would risk a potential coup. Leaders with strong elites must then find ways to appease insiders, and one way they do that is through repression.

By cracking down on opposition groups, leaders signal that they remain committed to protecting elite interests. Repression, in this sense, is not just about silencing dissent — it’s about managing elite politics. The book documents, for example, how Mexico’s presidents used repression against the same opposition they had long tolerated to compensate the party elite for accepting reforms that threatened their political influence.

When dictators deploy repression in this way, they solve a broader political dilemma. On the one hand, they must contend with a political elite that sees liberalization as a threat to its influence. But, on the other, they also need to avoid alienating international actors, such as the United States, that are quick to punish governments that abandon the Washington Consensus. Repression allows leaders to retain elite backing while adhering to international demands for economic liberalization.

How does your theory apply to Cuba or Venezuela today?

Both are cases where the details of the argument really matter. In recent months, Venezuela has been forced down the road of economic liberalization by the U.S., while Cuba has embarked on economic reforms – also under pressure from Washington.

A key distinction in my theory is that the effects of liberalization depend on how strong the regime’s elites are relative to the leader.

When elites are strong, dictators need to accommodate them, often by repressing outsiders to shield insiders from potential challenges. When elites are weak, leaders do not need to make those concessions.

The question then comes down to which of these two camps Venezuela and Cuba currently occupy.

In the case of Cuba, we have seen some of the power flow from the leader to the party. Former leader Raúl Castro extended and institutionalized the role of the party in the late 2010s. The military also gained more autonomy during that period, having secured economic privileges that are more resilient to the whims of the leader.

This all suggests that elites have extended their capacity to make demands on the leadership. In that context, further economic liberalization could trigger the dynamics I describe, pushing the regime toward more repression. There is a good argument that we have already started to see some of that.

Venezuela is in a similar situation. It is too early to say for sure, but the removal of Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. raid in January 2026 might create an opportunity for regime insiders to carve out some more independence and influence. If that is the case, then future deregulation may hurt, rather than help, human rights.

Ultimately, outcomes will depend on how these regimes evolve. But if current dynamics persist, external pressure for economic reform is unlikely to improve human rights – and may well make them worse, if my theory holds.

What surprised you when researching for the book?

I got the idea for this book from listening to my father’s stories about how the liberalization of the automobile industry in Mexico in the 1970s affected the factory where he worked. It was all very specific, so I assumed it would not apply more generally to more countries. But the more cases I looked at, the more I realized this pattern of liberalization leading to repression was not uncommon.

In the book, I ended up statistically estimating that most dictatorships who have liberalized have displayed this pattern.

Another thing that surprised me was how the implications of the core argument kept extending to new areas.

For example, I expected that leaders pushed to liberalize their economies would become especially repressive if they also faced the threat of international prosecution. These leaders want to avoid ending up in front of institutions like the International Criminal Court, so they go to greater lengths to stay in power. That often means keeping their elites satisfied at all costs.

Where else are you seeing the dynamic play out?

One area I’m watching is the rise of artificial intelligence. My book focuses on economic liberalization, but it really is about how autocratic regimes adapt to a shifting economic structure. When new sources of wealth or influence emerge, they can give leaders an opportunity to bring in new allies and, in the process, weaken established elites.

China is probably the most relevant case for how these dynamics might play out in AI. Under Xi Jinping, there has been a clear push to centralize control over the AI sector. For example, the new Central Science and Technology Commission is led by one of Xi’s closest allies, placing oversight of this key sector closer to his inner circle. At the same time, the state has been heavily involved in promoting AI firms aligned with priorities associated with Xi’s leadership, while disciplining more independent tech entrepreneurs.

What I find interesting is what this might mean politically. If these sectors are producing new elites whose success depends on their relationship with the leader, they could become an alternative base of support.

That, in turn, could give leaders more room to maneuver in dealing with established elites. I do not think we know yet how far that goes, but I suspect it may very much fall in line with the dynamics the book highlights.

José Kaire, Prrofessor of Political Science, Arizona State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

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“Demand is strong,” United CEO Scott Kirby told Wall Street analysts on a conference call Thursday. “United has proven that our brand loyal strategy is working, and we’re using today’s environment to accelerate our investments in all aspects of the customer experience from nose to tail.” 

United Airlines hasn’t quantified how much it’s increased fares, but flight search engine Skiplagged found that prices rose 35% for popular domestic routes and 15% for international destinations this summer, according to the New York Times.

Premium seats, premium strategy

Major carriers, most notably and successfully United and Delta Air Lines, have spent years persuading customers to pay more for tickets by investing in much improved services. The two airlines have built their businesses around higher-spending travelers, international networks, and lucrative loyalty programs. 

The goal is to have passengers see air travel not as a commodity so much as a quasi-luxury experience. That has meant adding premium seats, offering access to snazzier loungers, free upgrades, and baggage fee waivers. (Major U.S. airlines have also reduced capacity and cut flights, helping their pricing power.) Revenue from United’s high-end seats was up 16% in the most recent quarter versus a year ago, compared to basic economy revenue growth of 11%. A similar narrative is playing out at Delta, where premium revenue grew 17%, outpacing overall growth. 

And the two airlines are engaged in an arms war to convince travelers they offer the most deluxe flying experience. Delta, for instance, is testing planes in which the majority of seats are premium, while United touted plans to offer Wi-Fi supported by Elon Musk’s Starlink on 1,000 of its planes by year-end. (Delta has opted to go with Amazon’s satellite service, telling Fortune that its mix of entertainment and shopping options made it the more attractive partner.)

Teaching passengers to tolerate higher fares

These strategies have convinced passengers to go along with fare increases and be less sensitive to price. “There was another fare increase this week as fuel started to go back up. And there were no fare decreases when fuel went down,” Kirby said. (That is encouraging for United since it said its fuel costs could balloon by nearly $6 billion this year, higher than earlier projections. In the second quarter, United’s fuel expense was 84% higher than in the same period last year.)

And the tinkering with offerings continues. In March, United said it was swapping more economy seats for premium seats in some planes. This week, it announced it would roll out a new row in its “economy plus” area in which the middle seat is always empty, replaced by a shared table for the aisle- and window-seat travelers. It is reminiscent of British Airways’ short-haul business-class layout, which blocks out the middle seat, and is another example of airlines establishing more distinctions between cabins.

Kirby claimed that after stripping out inflation, plane ticket prices were about 13% below where they were pre-pandemic in 2019. And he noted that higher fares over the last few years were attributable to cost increases beyond fuel like airport fees, labor, and fleet maintenance.

That means passengers will likely have to live with higher fares, even if fuel costs drop, though so far, they’ve absorbed the hikes without much complaint. “Any industry has to pass along the price increases,” Kirby said.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

The 37-year-old first began his career like the thousands of his employees: as a server. While in high school, Adamolekun worked at Clyde’s, a local chain at the time located in suburban Maryland. He said it was there that he learned how to read people quickly, smooth over tense interactions, and make a customer feel even better than when they first walked through the door. Those were early lessons in a leadership skill he now considers indispensable.

“People come to the restaurant as an escape from whatever’s going on in their lives, and your job really is just to put a smile on their face and engage with them,” Adamolekun told Fortune in an interview on the sidelines of Jobs for the Future’s Horizons conference.

“You become good at managing difficult people and situations, which is an important skill. You learn how to lift people from one mindset to another one.”

Thanks to that crash course in human behavior, Adamolekun said today he’s applying those skills to a far wider audience as he wins back guests, reassures investors, and leads Red Lobster’s 30,000 employees in what he’s called the “‘greatest comeback in the history of the restaurant industry.”

From Zimbabwe, HBS, and Goldman Sachs to C-suite

Born in Nigeria to a neurosurgeon father and pharmacist mother, Adamolekun spent his early childhood on the move, including stops in Zimbabwe as well as the Netherlands before landing in central Illinois at age 9. His family later settled in Columbia, Maryland, and it was there that he developed an early interest in business and investing as a high schooler.

“I opened a stock portfolio and started buying stocks, and now I wanted to be Warren Buffett all of a sudden,” he recalled. 

Adamolekun began studying investing on his own—reading finance books and Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters, which became a blueprint for understanding Buffett’s investment philosophy and approach to business.

That interest eventually led him to Brown University, where he became a leader in the school’s investment club before beginning his career in investment banking at Goldman Sachs, where he spent two years before eventually returning to school to earn his MBA from Harvard Business School—and where he finally had the chance to meet Buffett.

What stood out most to Adamolekun was not just his investing track record, but Buffett’s willingness to document his thinking, acknowledge mistakes, and share those lessons with the next generation—principles that would later shape Adamolekun’s own leadership style.

“He has a process, and he has a way to do things,” Adamolekun said. “What I respect about him the most is the consistency of performance over 50, 60 years. That’s incredible… he’s like, ‘I’m not always right, but here’s what I see.’”

After graduating from Harvard in 2017, Adamolekun transitioned into hedge fund management, joining billionaire John Paulson at Paulson & Co., and it was there that he pitched his boss on acquiring struggling restaurant chain P.F. Chang’s. After the deal closed in 2019, he was tapped as the chain’s CEO at just 31 years old, making him one of the youngest leaders of a major restaurant brand.

A Buffett-inspired approach to rebuilding Red Lobster

Adamolekun successfully led P.F. Chang’s through pandemic-era restaurant upheaval—and returned the chain to growth. But soon, his career would be put to the test with a new challenge. In 2024, 35-year-old Adamolekun was brought in to lead Red Lobster after the company filed for bankruptcy protection, tasked with turning around yet another iconic but struggling restaurant chain.

Adamolekun has admitted Red Lobster had made a lot of mistakes, including a decision to make its endless shrimp promotion a year-round menu option in 2023. Recent court filings from Red Lobster’s previous CEO, Jonathan Tibus, said the shift ultimately put the company in the red $11 million in a single quarter.

As part of the turnaround, Adamolekun closed more than 100 locations and focused on returning to what he called Red Lobster’s core identity: delivering customers a memorable dining experience.

“People think we serve food, but what we serve is a guest experience, and a lot of that is human connection,” he said on stage at the JFF conference.

His early changes have also included simplifying the menu, investing in long-deferred restaurant maintenance, and focusing on the fundamentals of the guest experience. Moreover, he is pushing Red Lobster toward becoming one of the restaurant industry’s most technology-focused companies, including greater use of artificial intelligence to improve operations and let staff spend more time with customers.

“If a manager can spend less time in the office dealing with all of the inventory and scheduling and calendar and admin and all that stuff—they can be out on the floor with the guests,” Adamolekun said. “And they’re going, I think, to enjoy the job more.”

Adamolekun’s advice for Gen Z: “Better yourself” with AI

Adamolekun acknowledged that calls for greater AI adoption are not always easy to hear—especially for young workers entering a labor market where the technology is already reshaping career paths.

“It’d be dishonest or naive to think there couldn’t be issues with AI and the rate that it’s being adopted,” he said. “There can be issues with AI. That can be true. It can also be true that it can be a really useful tool for businesses and a really useful tool for people.”

Rather than resisting AI, Adamolekun believes workers should learn to use it.

“In the short term, it’s here, and the best thing you can probably do is figure out how to use it to your advantage,” Adamolekun said. “You need to use it to better yourself and be native and fluent with it because it’s important for the work that’s going to be done.”

He compares AI to “a high-powered assistant or chief of staff”—a tool that can make workers more productive, so long as they continue applying their own judgment rather than outsourcing their thinking. For Gen Z in particular, he said the key is to “attack it with bravery.”

“Stay with it. Be persistent. Find opportunities,” Adamolekun said. “Leverage AI to your advantage.”

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

The U.S. government started giving babies born during President Donald Trump’s second term a US$1,000 gift on July 4, 2026. This money goes into the accounts, which are named after the president. To get the free money, the babies’ parents or guardians just have to submit the required paperwork.

I am a business school professor who studies wealth, savings and spending. Additionally, I am expecting another grandchild soon. While other members of our family are picking out decorations for the baby’s room, my task is deciphering Trump Accounts.

While these accounts clearly could help boost savings, they come with many restrictions that limit their usefulness for important expenses young Americans incur, such as paying for college and buying their first home.

IRAs for jobless babies

Trump Accounts are a traditional individual retirement account, or IRA, for children. Currently, all money deposited in these savings vehicles will be invested in State Street Bank’s SPDR Portfolio – which mirrors the S&P 500 stock index.

They will function somewhat like traditional IRAs for grownups, for which contributions can be deducted from your taxable income in the year they’re made. However, withdrawals before or after retirement are taxed.

These new accounts come with three small twists:

First, the government is kicking in $1,000 for babies born in calendar years 2025 through 2028. Congressional funding for this gift expires Sept. 30, 2034, so procrastinators have six years beyond 2028 to create an account for their kids.

Second, some states, big companies and foundations are pledging extra money to the accounts. Additional contributions from, say, a child’s grandfather, are limited to $5,000 a year; the employer of a child’s parent and charities may kick in up to $2,500 annually.

To be clear, not all recipients of this money have to be babies. For example, tech executive Michael Dell and his wife, Susan Dell, are providing $250 for the first 25 million kids under age 10 who sign up for Trump Accounts and live in middle-to-lower-income neighborhoods.

Third, to contribute to these new plans, a child does not have to earn money from working, which is required for traditional and Roth IRAs.

Many people and media outlets are comparing and contrasting 529 college savings plans and Trump Accounts, However, Congress designed these plans with different goals.

These new accounts are really not designed to help families save for college costs. Instead, they are supposed to give children an early head start on saving for their retirement.

How much they could grow

A big idea behind Trump Accounts is that a small sum can turn into a big one, if left alone in an investment account with no withdrawals for a long time.

The main website for the accounts, trumpaccounts.gov, highlights the magic of compounding. While you may be mainly familiar with compound interest, compounding refers to anything growing over time.

The website estimates if the government’s $1,000 is left untouched with no further contributions, then by the time a child with a Trump Account turns 18, it would be worth $6,000. At age 27, their account would be worth $15,000, and at age 55, it would be worth $243,000.

Many financial planners do not believe that these simulations, which assume the stock market’s value increases by more than 10% a year, are realistic – even if past performance suggests this is reasonable to expect. That quarter-million dollars turns into a bit less than $9,000 if stock prices only grow by 4% annually over the next half-century or so.

That’s why there is a disclaimer in tiny type below the eye-popping numbers. It reads: “Actual results may differ and are not guaranteed.”

Trump Accounts also have another important limitation.

The only option available at this point is a fund that owns shares in the 500 largest U.S. publicly traded companies. Currently, this means about one-fifth of this money will be invested in Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft and Amazon since they’re the most valuable publicly traded companies today. In the future, there will be other options, but like the current choice, they mirror the stock market’s overall performance.

These accounts will support and boost the value of U.S. stocks, since a growing number of people – well, children – will be putting significant sums of money into the market that won’t be easy or cost-free to withdraw.

I believe that accounts like these are needed because they’ll boost Americans’ saving rate.

In 1975, Americans were saving over 13% of their disposable income, but by 2025, it was under 4%. This reduction in the savings rate means many Americans don’t have enough to cover emergencies, pay for a child’s college education or be ready for retirement.

5 downsides

Although Trump Accounts may help boost saving, they have some downsides.

First, no money can be taken out until the child turns at least 18, even with a penalty. After that point, the accounts can be rolled into another IRA.

Second, unless the account holder is withdrawing their money to help pay for their education, to buy a home or deal with disaster recovery, any withdrawals are subject to ordinary income tax rates.

Third, while traditional IRA contributions reduce your taxable income, any contributions you, your relatives or others make to Trump accounts do not. So they are not a way to reduce your tax bill.

Fourth, at age 18, all parental oversight disappears and the child has complete control of the money. Not all parents believe their child is capable of responsibly handling large amounts of money at that age.

Last, the accounts are not opened automatically. Parents or guardians have to request an account by dealing with the IRS.

Where Trump Accounts come from

The idea for these accounts did not come out of thin air.

In 1991, social scientist Michael Sherraden wrote a book proposing Individual Development Accounts. They offered a model for today’s Trump Accounts.

His idea: Provide low-income people with some assets – especially when they were young. These accounts were designed to boost people out of poverty by helping them afford a college education, buy a home and save for retirement. A variety of Individual Development Account programs were funded as pilot projects by states and foundations.

While the scope of these experiments were limited, evaluations of those pilot programs showed that providing funds early boosted home ownership and increased participants’ savings years later. These positive outcomes made it seem worth expanding what Sherradan and his team tried on a much larger scale.

Unfortunately, it’s also clear that attaching Trump’s name to the concept is rendering it less popular than it might have otherwise been.

However, there’s a clear precedent for this. Roth IRAs, after all, are named after Sen. William Roth Jr.. Roth, a Delaware Republican, championed the creation of retirement accounts when he served in Congress. Roth IRAs are the opposite of traditional IRAs. You can deposit some of your income after paying taxes on it into a Roth IRA and then take money out tax-free later.

As for me, I still don’t know how the new baby’s room will be decorated. However, I do know that creating an account is a smart idea, since it will give this child a financial boost down the line. I’ll even kick in extra money during the account’s first year to ensure the baby gets a bigger boost.

Jay L. Zagorsky, Associate Professor of Business, Boston University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

The U.S. military has reinstated a naval blockade and bombed Iran for several consecutive days, concentrating attacks on coastal areas near the Strait of Hormuz. But airstrikes have recently extended to infrastructure, such as railways that could be used to ferry weapons.

On Saturday, the U.S. military announced a new wave of airstrikes in retaliation for the deaths.

“The strikes are designed to further degrade Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and swiftly punish Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces who launched attacks against American service members in Jordan last night,” U.S. Central Command said.

At the same time, Iran has launched attacks on commercial ships and at its neighbors across the Persian Gulf region, targeting U.S. military assets. Tehran has also hit energy infrastructure and even water desalination plants.

Still, fighting hasn’t been as extensive as it was during the initial phases of the war. But U.S. deaths previously represented a red line for President Donald Trump.

Early last month—before both sides signed a memorandum of understanding that has since collapsed—he confided to aides that he would consider ending the prior ceasefire and go back to war if Iran kills American troops, according to the Wall Street Journal.

When asked for a comment and whether the U.S. would return to all-out war, the White House only responded with a statement from Central Command announcing the casualties.

Oil prices have jumped as fighting has intensified in recent days, and more war would deliver another shock to global markets.

Consuming countries have drawn down their oil stockpiles to the lowest level in decades with little breathing room left to endure another extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. established an alternate route through the narrow water to bypass an Iranian corridor, but the renewed fighting has effectively it shut down.

On Friday, no crossings via the U.S.-backed route were detected, and no shadow fleet movements were recorded either, while Iran’s route saw seven transits.

Despite the massive U.S.-Israeli bombardment, the war didn’t bring about an overthrow of Iran’s regime and has failed to fully reopen the strait.

To be sure, Iran’s economy is reeling and conventional forces were decimated, but the Islamic Republic has enough combat power to scare away commercial shipping and isn’t deterred from continuing its attacks.

Meanwhile, hopes for a new round of talks to cobble together another ceasefire are vanishing. Previously, some officials appeared to leave the door open to negotiations despite Tehran’s defiant statements in the face of U.S. strikes.

That’s after pragmatists inside Iran privately admitted that the initial naval blockade had crushed the economy, with the blockade’s resumption reportedly deepening a rift between pragmatists and hard-liners who want to fight more aggressively.

But on Saturday, Iran’s supreme leader warned of “unforgettable lessons” if the U.S. keeps attacking and called Trump’s signature “worthless and invalid.” 

For its part, the U.S. blames Iran for violating the ceasefire agreement by refusing to reopen the strait and attacking ships sailing outside of Tehran’s approved corridor.

The stalemate has raised fears of an endless war, something Trump campaigned on avoiding, as tit-for-tat attacks continue along an escalating spiral.

“The immediate dispute concerns who controls the Strait of Hormuz, but more is at stake,” Ali Vaez, the Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, wrote in a New York Times op-ed on Wednesday. “The collapse of even this minimal understanding could remove the last barrier between episodic confrontation and a forever war.”

Gregory Brew, senior analyst for Iran and energy with the Eurasia Group, told Fortune’s Jordan Blum earlier that there’s no military option for reopening the strait, adding that Iran will not let go of its main source of leverage.

He also warned that some form of Iranian fee to cross the strait seems inevitable and that U.S. attacks only strengthen Tehran’s resolve.

“The options are to escalate or cut a deal. And I think the [Trump] administration is likely to do the first, see it fail, and end up with the second,” Brew predicted.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com